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RECONCILING POLICE POWER 
PREROGATIVES, PUBLIC TRUST INTERESTS, 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS ALONG 
LAURENTIAN GREAT LAKES SHORES 
Richard K. Norton∗ 
Nancy H. Welsh∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 The Unites States has a north coast along its ‘inland seas’—the Laurentian Great 
Lakes. The country enjoys more than 4,500 miles of Great Lakes coastal shoreline, almost 
as much as its ocean coastal shorelines combined, excluding Alaska. The Great Lakes 
states are experiencing continued shorefront development and redevelopment, and there 
are growing calls to better manage shorelands for enhanced resiliency in the face of global 
climate change. The problem is that the most pleasant, fragile, and dangerous places are in 
high demand among coastal property owners, such that coastal development often yields 
the most tenacious of conflicts between public interests and private property rights. Indeed, 
those conflicts implicate fundamental debates over the state’s authorities and prerogatives 
to regulate privately owned shoreland (the police power), the public’s interest in coastal 
resources (the public trust doctrine), and private property owners’ rights to use and to 
exclude others from their shorelands (referred to collectively here as the private property 
doctrine). 
 While not tidal, standing water levels of the Great Lakes fluctuate over time 
substantially. As a result, the lakes have beaches much like ocean coasts, and the public 
trust doctrine is aptly applied to them, albeit awkwardly. All of the eight Great Lakes 
states have long acknowledged the applicability of the public trust doctrine to their Great 
Lakes bottomlands and shorelands. In doing so, they have accepted the now-conventional 
understanding that the doctrine originated in ancient Roman law. 
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 Even so, recent critiques of the public trust doctrine assert that it has been 
misinterpreted, and that its historical pedigree is not so strong or aptly applied to American 
coasts, especially along Great Lakes coasts. These critiques do not address the historical 
pedigree and robustness of the police power doctrine, or, more importantly, the pedigree 
and robustness of contemporary notions of private property rights. If the public trust 
doctrine is indeed lacking upon reconsideration, how does it fare in comparison to these 
other doctrines? 
 This Article lays the foundation for an extended study of the public trust doctrine as 
it applies to Great Lakes shores. We provide an overview of the public trust doctrines of 
all eight Great Lakes states, noting for illustration and, where appropriate, particulars for 
the State of Michigan, which enjoys more than 60% of the combined U.S. Great Lakes 
coastline. To explain our motivations in undertaking this study, the Article first briefly 
reviews the importance of the lakes to the State of Michigan and the other Great Lakes 
states more broadly and then frames shoreland management as one of the resource 
management imperatives those states face. The Article then reviews the historical origins, 
the contemporary contours, and the ongoing debates surrounding the police power, public 
trust, and private property doctrines separately. Building on that foundation, we then 
analyze how courts and legislatures have reconciled those doctrines through application in 
coastal settings broadly. 
 First, we find that the public trust doctrines of the Great Lakes states fall well 
within the boundaries of the origins and application of that doctrine throughout the 
nation’s history, even though the Lakes are not tidal. Second, we find that the concept of a 
‘moveable freehold’ inherent in the public trust doctrine—that the boundary separating 
state-owned submerged public trust land from privately owned upland along the shore—
reflects natural dynamic shoreline processes, not arbitrary governmental rulemaking, and 
is well established and accepted by all Great Lakes states. 
 Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this Article, we find that all three 
doctrines—public trust, police powers, and private property rights—trace their roots to 
English common law and even ancient Roman law, but all are in fact distinctly 
American doctrines. All three doctrines were first fully articulated in the context of unique 
American institutions, values, and conflicts. Each has evolved over time as American 
institutions, values, and conflicts have similarly evolved. Thus, despite detractors’ 
assertions to the contrary, the public trust doctrine is no less robust or aptly applied to 
Great Lakes coasts than is either the police power or private property rights doctrine. In 
fact, despite case law and commentary rhetoric that can be dogmatically extreme, efforts to 
understand and reconcile these doctrines in practice generally strike a pragmatic balance 
between the private rights inherent in shoreland property ownership and the public interest 
in common access to and use of submerged lands and the foreshore. 
 Following our analysis of these doctrines from a broad perspective, we conclude by 
providing a brief overview of the several public trust doctrines as adapted by all of the 
Great Lakes states and finally identifying a number of questions for further study. 
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The Unites States has a north coast along its ‘inland seas,’ the Laurentian 
Great Lakes. Because these freshwater inland seas drain to the Atlantic Ocean 
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through the Gulf of St. Lawrence, they are referred to as the ‘Laurentian’ Great 
Lakes by great lakes researchers to distinguish them from other great lakes global-
ly.1 The five Laurentian Great Lakes, which include Lakes Superior, Michigan, 
Huron, Erie, and Ontario, and the St. Lawrence Seaway altogether touch eight 
U.S. states and two Canadian provinces, including the States of Minnesota, Wis-
consin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York and the 
Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. 
Taken together, the five Great Lakes extend some 750 miles from west to east 
and cover a combined surface area of about 95,000 square miles, roughly the same 
size as the United Kingdom.2 U.S. Great Lakes’ shorelines combined, not includ-
ing connecting waters, total more than 4,500 miles, making the U.S. Great Lakes 
coast almost as long as the U.S. Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and Atlantic coasts com-
bined, excluding Alaska.3 Of the eight states bordering the Laurentian Great 
Lakes, the State of Michigan is the self-proclaimed “Great Lakes State.”4 It is 
unique among them in that its two peninsulas touch four of the five Great Lakes 
(Superior, Michigan, Huron, and Erie). In addition, Michigan’s Lower Peninsula 
touches an additional large (but not ‘Great’) lake that is part of the same system—
Lake St. Clair;5 while the entire land area of the state, save for a tiny sliver at its 
southwest corner, drains to the Great Lakes Basin. 
For all of the Great Lakes states, the lakes have served historically as a major 
waterborne avenue for commerce,6 the source of vibrant freshwater commercial 
and recreational fishing industries,7 and the locus for shorefront industries.8 They 
 1. Laurentian Great Lakes, GLOBAL GREAT LAKES, http://www.globalgreatlakes.org/lgl/ (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
 2. About Our Great Lakes: Great Lakes Basin Facts, U.S. GREAT LAKES ENVTL. RESEARCH 
LABORATORY, https://www.glerl.noaa.gov/education/ourlakes/facts.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2018); 
The Great Lakes, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/greatlakes (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2018). 
 3. Andrew D. Gronewold, et al., Coasts, Water Levels, and Climate Change: A Great Lakes Per-
spective, 120 CLIMATE CHANGE 697, 697-99 (2013). 
 4. Michigan’s official state motto is “Si quaeris peninsulam amoenam circumspice,” or “If you 
seek a pleasant peninsula, look about you.” State Motto, MICHIGAN.GOV, 
https://www.michigan.gov/som/0,4669,7-192-29938_30245-2606—,00.html (last visited Nov. 27, 
2018). 
 5. Lake St. Clair separates Lakes Huron and Erie along the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers but is 
not considered by convention to be one of the ‘Great’ lakes, even though Lake St. Clair bottomlands are 
regulated by Michigan as Great Lakes bottomlands. See infra Appendix A. 
 6. GOV’T. OF CAN. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE GREAT LAKES: AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS AND RESOURCE BOOK 17-18 (3rd ed. 1995), 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P1004ICU.PDF?Dockey=P1004ICU.PDF [hereinafter GREAT 
LAKES ATLAS] (“The development of the Great Lakes region proceeded along several lines that took 
advantage of the many resources within the basin. The waterways became major highways of trade and 
were exploited for their fish.”). 
 7. Id.; DANIEL R. TALHELM, ECONOMICS OF GREAT LAKES FISHERIES: A 1985 
ASSESSMENT 3 (Great Lakes Fishery Comm’n, Tech. Report No. 54, 1988); see Kristin M. Szylvian,  
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also offer abundant recreational opportunities for the state’s broader citizenry and 
vacationing visitors within federal, state, and local parks, as well as for the owners 
and tenants of privately held shorefront properties.9 It has been estimated that 
about 80% of the U.S. Great Lakes shoreline is privately owned, much of which 
was developed for shorefront homes, ranging from cottages to mansions.10 Within 
the past several decades, as industrial uses have declined, and recreational activities 
have increased, Great Lakes shorelines have become increasingly important to a 
tourism-based economy, both through the tourist-oriented reinvigoration of small 
coastal communities and through a robust shorefront rental home economy.11 
Management of the Great Lakes has created three broad legal issues. These 
include: first, water quantity concerns, especially uses of Great Lakes water that 
Transforming Lake Michigan into the ‘World’s Greatest Fishing Hole’: The Environmental Politics of Michigan’s 
Great Lakes Sport Fishing, 1965-1985, 9 ENVTL. HIST. 102, 102 (2002) [hereinafter Transforming Lake 
Michigan] (accounting of the fishing industry’s effects on the State of Michigan). 
 8. GREAT LAKES ATLAS, supra note 6, at 24: 
Nearly all the settlements that grew into cities in the Great Lakes region were established 
on the waterways that transported people, raw materials and goods. The largest urban areas 
developed at the mouths of tributaries because of transportation advantages and the appar-
ently inexhaustible supply of fresh water for domestic and industrial use. Historically, the 
major industries in the Great Lakes region have produced steel, paper, chemicals, automo-
biles and other manufactured goods. 
 9. A quick review of Michigan’s Great Lakes shoreline, for example, reveals eighteen different 
state and national parks along the Lower Peninsula’s Lake Michigan Shoreline alone. Recreation Search, 
MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, http://www.michigandnr.com/parksandtrails/#map-tab (last visit-
ed Nov. 7, 2018). 
 10. Terry Gibb, Lakes Appreciation Month: The Great Lakes Facts and Features, MICH. ST. U. 
EXTENSION (July 20, 2015), http://msue.anr.msu.edu/news/lakes_appreciation_month_the_great_
lakes_facts_and_features; OFFICE OF THE GREAT LAKES, MICH. DEP’T. OF ENVTL. QUALITY, MI-
GREAT LAKES PLAN: OUR PATH TO PROTECT, RESTORE, AND SUSTAIN MICHIGAN’S NATURAL 
TREASURES 29 (2009), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/MI-GLPlan_262388_7.pdf. 
 11. There appear to be no systematic studies that analyze the tourist-oriented reinvigoration of 
small coastal communities along the Great Lakes shorelines or the shorefront rental home economy. 
However, there are studies that establish that people value riparian areas, like the Great Lakes, as a 
source for recreation and tourism. See HERBERT W. SCHROEDER, USDA FOREST SERV., VOICES 
FROM MICHIGAN’S BLACK RIVER: OBTAINING INFORMATION ON “SPECIAL PLACES” FOR NATURAL 
RESOURCE PLANNING 4-10 (1996), https://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/gtr/gtr_nc184.pdf; Larry W. Tom-
baugh, Factors Influencing Vacation Home Locations, 2 J. LEISURE RES., Winter 1970 at 54, 56. Studies 
have also found that Michigan had more than 223,000 seasonal homes in 1997, almost six percent of all 
housing units in the state. DANIEL J. STYNES ET AL., SEASONAL HOMES AND NATURAL RESOURCES: 
PATTERNS OF USE AND IMPACT IN MICHIGAN 1 (1997), https://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/gtr/gtr_
nc194.pdf. This phenomenon is not exclusive to Michigan. Pamela J. Jakes et al., A Framework for Profil-
ing a Lake’s Riparian Area Development Potential, 69 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 391, 391 (2003). In fact, govern-
ment officials from the State of Michigan have sought to redevelop the state’s Great Lakes shores in 
order to foster economic development and recreation as early as 1955. Transforming Lake Michigan, supra 
note 7, at 107-08.  
 
NORTON_MEA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2019  3:21 PM 
414 Michigan Journal of  Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 8:2 
involve exporting it from the basin;12 second, water quality concerns, such as the 
pollution of the lakes from a variety of toxic substances,13 thermal pollution (e.g., 
power plant cooling water discharge),14 and biological contamination (e.g., invasive 
 12. A prominent and controversial concern regarding the Great Lakes over the past half-century 
has been the potential diversion of Great Lakes water to slake the thirst of other regions of the U.S. and 
Canada, which is not out of the question technologically. Indeed, there have been grand proposals for 
substantial diversions from the Great Lakes to serve the Midwest, the arid Southwest, and other regions 
of the U.S. since at least the 1950s, while Canada has already engineered substantial cross-basin diver-
sions elsewhere in the country. Frédéric Lasserre, Continental Bulk-Water Transfers: Chimera or Real Pos-
sibility?, in WATER WITHOUT BORDERS? CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND SHARED WATERS 88, 
88-112 (Emma S. Norman, Alice Cohen & Karen Bakker eds., 2013); Ralph Pentland, Key Challenges in 
Canada-US Water Governance, in WATER WITHOUT BORDERS? CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND 
SHARED WATERS 119, 122 (Emma S. Norman, Alice Cohen & Karen Bakker eds., 2013). Nonetheless, 
major diversions are not likely to occur at this time because of the creation of the Great Lakes-St. Law-
rence River Basin Water Resources Council and the enactment of legislation in all 10 Great Lakes states 
and provinces that greatly strengthened regional and bi-national control over the use and potential di-
version of Great Lakes water, subsequently ratified in the U.S. by Congress and in Canada by parallel 
provincial legislation. Jamie Linton & Noah Hall, The Great Lakes: A Model of Transboundary Coopera-
tion, in WATER WITHOUT BORDERS? CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND SHARED WATERS 221, 
231-35 (Emma S. Norman, Alice Cohen & Karen Bakker eds., 2013). 
 13. The U.S.-Canada Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) is a commitment “to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Waters of the Great Lakes,” 
and “provides a framework for identifying binational priorities and implementing actions that improve 
water quality,” such as designating Areas of Concern (AOCs). Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
(GLWA), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/glwqa (last visited Sept. 11, 2018). 
The Great Lakes National Program Office (GLNPO) helps coordinate the efforts of the GLWQA by 
bringing together federal, state, tribal, local, and industry partners under the strategic framework of the 
Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI), which fulfills the aims of the GLWQA. Great Lakes Nation-
al Program Office (GLNPO), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/
about-great-lakes-national-program-office-glnpo (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). The GLRI seeks to address 
five “urgent” issues, including cleaning up toxic substances and areas of concern and promoting near-
shore health by protecting watersheds from polluted run-off. Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI), 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY., https://www.epa.gov/great-lakes-funding/great-lakes-restoration-
initiative-glri (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
 14. “Thermal pollution occurs when humans change the temperature of a body of water . . . and 
can result in significant changes to the aquatic environment.” MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, 
WATER QUALITY PARAMETERS: BACTERIA, BIOCHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND, DISSOLVED 
OXYGEN, PH, PHOSPHORUS, TEMPERATURE, TOTAL SUSPENDED SOLIDS 10, 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/wrd-npdes-water-quality_570237_7.pdf. Some causes of 
thermal pollution include: cooling water to prevent machinery from overheating; stormwater runoff 
from warm surfaces; soil erosion, which can cause cloudy conditions in a water body; and the removal of 
trees and vegetation, which normally shade water. Id. Cooling water discharge from old lake-side power 
plants is a major source of thermal pollution as well. Not only does the water intake process at such 
power plants pull through and kill fish, the discharged water is “pumped back into Lake Michigan and 
other Great Lakes up to 30 degrees hotter, encouraging the growth of oxygen-depleting algae that kills 
fish and fouls beaches.” Michael Hawthorne, Millions of Great Lakes Fish Killed in Power Plant Intakes, 
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fish and wetlands plant species);15 and finally, shoreland area management con-
cerns. The focus of this Article is on the latter, including Great Lakes submerged 
lands and foreshore subject to the public trust doctrine, along with additional 
shorelands—foreshore and beyond—subject to state and local police power prerog-
atives. 
Merriam-Webster provides as a second definition of the word foreshore: “the 
part of the seashore between high-water and low-water marks.”16 The foreshore 
properly defines the reach of coastal lands subject to state and local authorities em-
anating from the public trust doctrine, while both the foreshore and other 
shorelands further landward are subject to state and coastal regulations emanating 
from the state’s police power authorities, as discussed in more detail below.17 For 
this reason, this Article addresses land management authorities over “shorelands” 
more broadly—i.e., the foreshore plus additional nearshore coastal lands beyond 
the foreshore, noting where public trust authorities are constrained specifically to 
the foreshore as appropriate. 
There are good reasons to focus on Great Lakes shorelands, especially Michi-
gan’s Great Lakes shorelands. These reasons include continued development and 
redevelopment of shorefront properties throughout the state’s Great Lakes shores18 
and growing calls for more state and local efforts to manage shorelands for en-
hanced resiliency in the face of global climate change.19 Moreover, all eight of the 
 15. There are more than 180 exotic species in the Great Lakes, such as green algae, sea lamprey, 
alewife, Eurasian watermilfoil, and zebra mussel. WILLIAM RAPAI, LAKE INVADERS: INVASIVE 
SPECIES AND THE BATTLE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT LAKES 1 (2016), 
https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/1803963/pdf. These invasive species have changed the populations of 
native fish, water clarity, and water chemistry, and the food web and nutrient cycle of the Great Lakes 
region. Id. 
 16. Foreshore, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2002). 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. Focusing on, and planning wisely for, the continued development and redevelopment along 
Michigan’s Great Lakes shoreline is important because land use decisions (especially at the local level) 
can adversely affect the aquatic ecosystems that Michigan relies on, and also expose community infra-
structure and other investments to unnecessary risks like extreme weather events (i.e., coastal flooding 
and erosion). See MICH. OFFICE OF THE GREAT LAKES ET AL., SUSTAINING MICHIGAN’S WATER 
HERITAGE: A STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 20-21 (2016). Land use management along 
riparian systems, in particular the maintenance of natural buffers between development and the water 
features, can help reduce the amount of pollutants entering waterways, protect against erosion and flood 
damage to infrastructure, provide habitats for native species, and serve as recreation corridors. Id. at 21. 
 19. As discussed in more detail below, managing Great Lakes shorelands in the face of global 
climate change is complicated because of the unique dynamics of the Great Lakes system, especially 
with regard to fluctuating standing water levels. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. See, e.g., 
LIVING ON THE COAST: PROTECTING INVESTMENTS IN SHORE PROPERTY ON THE GREAT LAKES 
(Philip Keillor, ed., 2003), http://greatlakesresilience.org/sites/default/files/library_reference_
2003_UWSeaGrant-USACE_LivingontheCoastProtectingInvestmentsinShorePropertyonthe
GreatLakes.pdf.; Richard K. Norton, Guy A. Meadows & Lorelle A. Meadows, The Deceptively Compli-
cated “Elevation Ordinary High Water Mark” and the Problem With Using on a Laurentian Great Lakes Shore, 
39 J. GREAT LAKES RES. 527 (2013). Given global climate change and the challenges it poses, the  
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Great Lakes states have applied the public trust doctrines to their Great Lakes 
shores, and the U.S. Supreme Court has also acknowledged the applicability of 
that doctrine in the Great Lakes.20 Even so, there are physical attributes of the 
Great Lakes and their shores that have only recently become well-understood and 
that make application of legal doctrines drawn from other settings (i.e., particularly 
the public trust doctrine) appropriate but less than straightforward. Most relevant 
for purposes here, the Great Lakes are not tidal. The standing water levels of all of 
the Great Lakes do fluctuate substantially over the course of years and decades, 
however, such that there are elevations to which lake waters ‘ordinarily’ reach peri-
odically over time, and correspondingly ‘ordinary high water marks’ that lake wa-
ters leave along the shore accordingly (i.e., marks lakeward of which the shoreline 
is alternatively submerged and exposed for extended periods of time).21 Finally, 
despite case law stretching back to the incorporation of the Great Lakes states,22 as 
well as state legislation speaking to the Great Lakes specifically,23 there has been 
limited on-point litigation or legislation that might provide clarification for resolv-
ing shoreland disputes that could arise in the foreseeable future. 
Perhaps more profoundly, the most pleasant, fragile, and dangerous places are 
highly prized by coastal shoreline property owners, such that coastal shoreland de-
velopment often yields the most tenacious of conflicts between public interests and 
private property rights.24 Indeed, conflicts over the development and use of 
shorelands on a Great Lake implicate timeless debates over the public interest in 
coastal resources, private property owners’ rights to use and to exclude others from 
their shorelands, and the authorities and prerogatives of the state to own public 
Michigan Coastal Zone Management Program (MCZMP) has focused on supporting efforts by coastal 
localities to adopt plans and policies designed to make them more resilient communities environmental-
ly, socially, and economically. In support of those efforts, a multi-disciplinary team of planners and 
researchers from the University of Michigan, Michigan Technological University, and the non-profit 
Land Information Access Association (LIAA) have been working with selected coastal communities to 
better integrate scientific knowledge and best management practices to better identify and analyze 
coastal hazard areas, and to fold those analyses and corresponding resiliency policies into their local 
master plans, zoning codes, capital improvement programs, and so on. See RESILIENT GREAT LAKES 
COAST, http://resilientgreatlakescoast.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2018) (providing more information on 
the work to increase Great Lake shoreland’s resiliency and products from it). 
 20. See infra Section II.B & Appendix A. 
 21. See, e.g., Norton et al., supra note 19 (describing the seasonal and decadal fluctuations of 
Great Lakes standing water levels and the difficulties that phenomenon creates in terms of determining 
appropriately the ordinary high-water mark on Great Lakes shores). 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. See, e.g., Dan Carden & Doug Ross, Battle Over Lakeshore Access Escalates in Long Beach De-
spite Indiana Supreme Court Ruling, NORTHWEST IND. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/laporte/battle-over-lakeshore-access-escalates-in-long-beach-
despite-indiana/article_cfc96587-8b64-5282-b863-f956c57e49eb.html (describing controversy along 
Indiana’s Great Lakes shores between private ownership and public use, prompting an Indiana Supreme 
Court decision appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court).  
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shoreland and to regulate privately owned shoreland, along with various con-
straints on those powers. These conflicts reflect ongoing efforts to reconcile the 
state’s interests in its coastal shorelands, embodied through the police power and 
public trust doctrines,25 against private shoreland owners’ property rights, safe-
guarded primarily through the substantive due process and regulatory takings doc-
trines.26 Great Lakes shoreland disputes, especially, exemplify the tensions and dif-
ficulties of these broader debates because the histories of the doctrines are so nu-
nuanced and rich, and because shoreline settings are valuable in so many ways. 
Reflecting those debates, several prominent critiques of the public trust doc-
trine assert that doctrine in particular has been misinterpreted—that its historical 
pedigree is not so strong or aptly applied to American coasts as either the doc-
trine’s proponents or the courts take it to be, especially along Great Lakes coasts.27 
These critiques, made first in the early 1970s and relied on more recently, were 
based primarily on historical analyses of ancient Roman, medieval English, and 
early American texts. Other scholars have since contested critics’ assertions with 
their own historical analyses using the same and related sources.28 
Any ancient doctrine can be critiqued for its applicability today in isolation of 
other considerations. Rather than asking whether ancient Roman doctrine perfectly 
justifies contemporary doctrine taken by itself, the more germane question is 
whether the historical origins of the public trust doctrine and its evolution over 
time are sufficiently sound and apt for providing meaningful guidance today in the 
context of the other doctrines we look to for resolving disputes at the coast. Nei-
ther early nor more recent critics of the public trust doctrine address the historical 
pedigree and robustness of those other relevant doctrines at play on a coastal 
shore—the police power doctrine, or, more importantly, contemporary notions of 
private property rights. If the public trust doctrine is lacking upon reconsideration, 
how does it fare in comparison to these other doctrines? Or conversely, are those 
other doctrines, in terms of their historical pedigree and applicability today, any 
more compelling or controlling than is the public trust doctrine in comparison? 
To provide a foundation for more extended analysis of specific legal disputes 
likely to arise along Great Lakes shores, and to assess in particular the applicability 
of the public trust doctrine to those shores, we first analyze through juxtaposition 
these three key American legal doctrines as they intersect along Great Lakes 
coastal shorelands—police power prerogatives, public trust doctrines, and private 
property rights. To do so, we review the history of each doctrine and synthesize, 
compare, and contrast them; summarize critiques of them, including especially cri-
 25. As discussed below, the “police power doctrine” is not conventionally referred to as such, 
but it arguably qualifies as a doctrine by definition and we use that label for ease of reference here. See 
infra Section II.A. 
 26. See infra Section II.C. 
 27. See infra Section II.B.4; see also infra note 121. 
 28. See infra Section II.B.5.  
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tique of the public trust doctrine; and then present our own assessment regarding 
those critiques. The Article concludes with an overview summary of the public 
trust doctrines of the several Great Lakes States. 
This Article will hopefully provide guidance to state and local governmental 
officials as they contemplate Great Lakes shoreland management efforts; private 
property owners as they contemplate development or use their shorefront proper-
ties otherwise; and the courts as they adjudicate disputes as may arise. The Article 
should be of interest broadly in all of the Great Lakes coastal states, and even 
ocean coastal states, given similarities in the legal doctrines they have engaged and 
the physical dynamics of the coastal shorelines they enjoy.29 
The Article is organized into four parts. The key powers and doctrines at issue 
on coastal shorelines arose in English and American common law, and they have 
since been clarified and modified by constitutional and positive law. Given that 
progression, Part I offers some initial observations on the challenges of deciphering 
and justifying the origins and evolution of such powers and doctrines over time, 
challenges clearly evident along Great Lakes shorelines. Part II provides an histori-
cal exposition of these powers and doctrines separately as they have taken shape in 
general, focusing especially on the public trust doctrine and its origins in ocean 
coastal settings. Part III offers some initial thoughts on reconciling powers, inter-
ests, rights, and doctrines along coastal shores in general. Part IV concludes by 
summarizing and contemplating briefly the public trust doctrines of the several 
Great Lakes states based on review of the current statutory and case law of those 
states, and then finally identifies a number of questions for further study—
questions that are best addressed in a state-specific context. 
I.  A CONFLUENCE OF AMERICAN LEGAL DOCTRINES IN  
COASTAL SETTINGS 
The coastlines of oceans and large inland lakes, given their special ecological, 
economic, and aesthetic attributes, implicate conflicts between communal or collec-
tive interests and concerns and individual interests and rights. In coastal settings 
especially, collective concerns take shape primarily through the state’s preroga-
tives30 under the police powers doctrine,31 and its duties and interests under the 
 29. Great Lakes differ from oceans in that, while not tidal, their standing water levels fluctuate 
over time. Even so, during periods of rising standing water levels, Great Lakes coasts are similar to 
ocean coasts currently facing rising sea levels. See, e.g., Norton et al., supra note 19, at 527. 
 30. Black’s defines “prerogative” as an “exclusive or peculiar right or privilege. The special pow-
er . . . vested in an official person . . . or in an official body, as a court or legislature.” Prerogative, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Deluxe 6th ed., 1990). Merriam-Webster similarly defines prerogative, 
first, as “an exclusive or special . . . power . . . belonging to an office or an official body . . . [or] . . . one 
possessed by a nation as an attribute of sovereignty,” and second, as “the discretionary power inhering 
in the British Crown.” Prerogative, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2002). 
Black’s alternatively describes “right” as a “power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitu-
tion, statutes or decisional laws, or claimed as a result of long usage. . . . In a narrower signification, an  
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public trust doctrine. The police powers doctrine speaks to the special or unique 
prerogatives of a state as sovereign (or its local units of government enabled 
through delegation) to enact laws for the benefit of society. The public trust doc-
trine speaks to communal interests in submerged lands and foreshores of oceans 
and large lakes, held in trust by the state as sovereign.32 
Set in tension with these collectively-oriented doctrines are interests of the 
individual, which take form along a coastal shore primarily as private property 
rights. The protections of rights inherent in private property are not conventional-
ly conceived of as a single discrete or coherent doctrine, but rather are vindicated 
largely through the due process and regulatory takings doctrines.33 Taken altogeth-
er, they speak to a private shoreland property owner’s reasonable expectations that 
his or her interests will not be abused by the arbitrary or tyrannical exercise of 
governmental powers.34 Because all of these doctrines originate in the common law 
and have evolved through constitutional and positive law, it is helpful to consider 
first two distinct challenges that arise in deciphering and justifying the evolution of 
these common law doctrines, especially in coastal settings. 
interest in an object of property. . . . A legally enforceable claim of one person against another. . . . 
That which one person ought to have or receive from another. . . .” Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(Deluxe 6th ed., 1990). As discussed in more detail below, the police power has been conflated with the 
concept of “states’ rights” as derived from the 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and “rights” in 
that context is used to distinguish state authorities as against federal authorities. See infra Section 
II.A.2. In addition, the concept of rights, especially in contemporary use, has evolved to encompass 
broadly a claim to do something unhindered or to receive some benefit, both as against some other indi-
vidual or governmental entity. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 1-17 (1991). The concept that states’ rights originated from the U.S. Constitu-
tion is not quite correct historically, however, and our consideration of the authorities a state deploys 
along coastal shorelands is based on its special role or privilege as a sovereign, acting through its legisla-
ture, to promote the public welfare, rather than merely or necessarily claims of authority a state makes 
vis-à-vis the federal government. Moreover, a state does not have a right to regulate private property so 
much as a valid authority to do so, while a property owner may claim his or her right to be treated fairly 
by the state but not so much the authority to do so. We adopt the term prerogative, therefore, to de-
scribe the authorities that states deploy in managing their coastal shorelines under their police powers, 
particularly as juxtaposed with a shoreland property owner’s right to be treated fairly when thus regulat-
ed. 
 31. Black’s defines “doctrine” as “a rule, principle, theory, or tenet of the law.” It further defines 
“doctrinal interpretation” as interpretation based upon the “intrinsic reasonableness” of the statement of 
law, as distinguished from “legal interpretation” or that based upon the statement of law itself (e.g., 
statutory interpretation where the meaning is expressly stated). Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(Deluxe 6th ed., 1990). As discussed in more detail below, coherent—if contestable—rules, theories, or 
tenets of law can be articulated around concepts of a state’s unique police power prerogatives, and the 
exercise of those prerogatives can be evaluated in terms of their intrinsic reasonableness. While not 
conventionally referred to as such, we adopt the terms police power doctrine and police power preroga-
tives for the sake of exposition here. See infra Section II.A. 
 32. Police power prerogatives are regularly and extensively delegated by states to their local 
units. Infra Section II.A. Public trust authorities, however, appear not to be. Infra Section II.B. 
 33. Infra Section II.C. 
 34. See infra Part II.  
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The first challenge speaks to the difficulty of making claims to authority when 
stating factual propositions about the world or legal propositions about our rela-
tionships to the world and to one another, along with the need to account for the 
relationships between facts and law. Scientists justify factual propositions by refer-
ence to the rigor of the scientific methods used to develop those propositions and 
by the logic or internal coherence embodied within them, where both methods and 
logic are filtered by scientists’ evolving expectations over time.35 Contemporary 
debates about global climate change—whether it is happening, what is causing it, 
and how it will manifest itself over time—provide a remarkable illustration of this 
process. Indeed, climate change highlights the added challenge of moving scientifi-
cally-accepted knowledge into popular awareness when accepting that knowledge 
implies, in turn, accepting the need to change our way of life.36 
In contrast, legal scholars and jurists justify legal propositions by reference to 
the historical pedigree of those propositions and by the logic or internal coherence 
embodied within those propositions, where both pedigree and logic are filtered by 
expectations about what the law should be and how it should operate. Those expec-
tations similarly evolve over time. This process is well illustrated by the evolution 
of concepts of police power prerogatives, public trust interests, and private proper-
ty rights along a coastal shoreline. 
Both scientific and legal claims are ultimately bound by physical reality. One 
may make scientific claims about the realities or myths of climate change or adopt 
legal fictions about private property rights within dynamic natural systems, but 
Nature cares nothing for human expectations, aspirations, or legal doctrines and 
will proceed remorselessly. A shorefront home perched high upon an eroding bluff 
will surely be lost to erosion, regardless of how strenuously the homeowner claims 
a constitutional right to possess and reside in her home. The point is that physical 
realities, scientific knowledge, and legal theorizing are inseparable in a way that 
cannot be avoided in dynamic settings like coastal shorelines, a phenomenon espe-
cially evident as Great Lakes state courts and legislatures have attempted to de-
marcate boundaries between public and private interests along constantly shifting 
Great Lakes shores.37 
A second challenge relates to the role of expectations in evaluating the histori-
cal pedigree of common law doctrines. As noted, much of the doctrinal law at issue 
in disputes along Great Lakes shores emanates from English and American com-
 35. See, e.g., Karl Popper’s seminal description of the hypothetico-deductive scientific method 
employed for contemporary scientific research. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC 
DISCOVERY (Hutchinson & Co. ed., 1959). See also Thomas Kuhn’s seminal discussion of how para-
digms shape scientists’ thinking within and about their research. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE 
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1996). 
 36. See, e.g., Richard K. Norton, Agenda 21 and Its Discontents: Is Sustainable Development a Global 
Imperative or Globalizing Conspiracy?, 46 URB. LAW. 325 (2014). 
 37. See infra Part IV.  
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mon law.38 American common law is conventionally understood as the “state statu-
tory and case law background of England and the American colonies before the 
American revolution.”39 While American common law is often discussed and in-
voked as if it were a body of static and timeless rules or principles, it has never 
been conceived strictly as either of those things. 
Rather, like state and federal constitutional doctrines, common law evolves 
over time casuistically, reflecting the context of place and time and balancing the 
precedential benefits of certainty and consistency in the law with the need for the 
law to adapt to extant conditions and expectations. The notion of a ‘regulatory tak-
ing,’ for example, was not originally understood as emanating from the U.S. Con-
stitution’s takings clause, but it has become accepted constitutional doctrine to-
day.40 Similarly, the state-specific refinement of the public trust doctrine as 
applied to Great Lakes shorelines, described in more detail below, provides a nota-
ble example of evolving doctrine in both theory and application.41 The role of ex-
pectations in this evolutionary process, especially harking back to the historical 
pedigree of common law doctrine, is problematic in a compound way; that is, ex-
pectations in a pluralistic society are and never have been uniform at any given 
time, and they inevitably change over time. 
As well-illustrated by evolving public trust and regulatory takings doctrines, 
for example, jurists, legal commentators, and private citizens today hold dramati-
cally different views on what public trust interests and private property rights are, 
as well as what the origins of those rights and interests were. There is no reason to 
think that jurists, commentators, or citizens in earlier times were any more agreea-
ble or unified in their understanding of what the law was then compared to how it 
is characterized today—especially when the law in question is the common law. 
This is true as well with regard to contemporary attempts to decipher the original 
meaning of constitutional provisions, such as the Takings Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution, in order to understand and justify its application today.42 
Thus, strong statements on what police power prerogatives, public trust inter-
ests, or private property rights are today based on dogmatic characterizations of 
what they were at some point in the past should be read carefully and in full con-
text. More importantly, such statements should be read with full recognition that 
the thinking of jurists and treatise writers, as recorded when ancient common law 
was first laid down, was surely more nuanced and contested than how it is typically 
 38. See infra Section II.B. 
 39. Common Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Deluxe 6th ed., 1990). 
 40. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Supreme Court Roadblocks to Responsive Coastal Management in 
the Wake of Lucas, 53 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 59, 64-73 (2018). 
 41. See infra Section II.B. 
 42. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, in part, “nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. See infra Section II.C for 
discussion of attempts to decipher the original meaning of this clause.  
 
NORTON_MEA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2019  3:21 PM 
422 Michigan Journal of  Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 8:2 
represented today, particularly when characterized through argumentative writ-
ings. The importance of this exhortation becomes evident when attempting to rec-
oncile the tensions between public and private interests along coastal shores. 
II.  POLICE POWER PREROGATIVES, PUBLIC TRUST INTERESTS, AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COASTAL SETTINGS GENERALLY 
Reconciling public and private interests along a coastal shore is a multi-
dimensional endeavor. It requires first reconciling the ancient-to-contemporary 
understandings of the different doctrines at play along a coastal shore within those 
doctrines themselves, and then reconciling those doctrines as against one another. 
We first discuss briefly the origins and meanings of the police powers and public 
trust doctrines, and then the origins and meanings of concepts of private property 
rights in the American context, especially along coastal shores. We then offer some 
thoughts on reconciling those doctrines in coastal settings generally. 
A.  Police Power Prerogatives over Coastal Shorelands (and Beyond) 
While the ‘police power’ essentially originated in common law, it was first 
recognized and modified by federal constitutional law and then given more con-
crete form through state constitutions and legislation.43 Its common law origins 
come from the notion that the colonies, after separating from the English constitu-
tional monarchy, inherited the governmental powers that the English crown and 
parliament taken together had enjoyed.44 The police power represents a unique 
American concept that manifested because of the relationship forged between the 
states and the new national government through the adoption of the U.S. Consti-
tution. It is today widely recognized and cited as a concept (if not a doctrine), but 
it has not been discussed much by legal theorists, at least compared to related doc-
trines like due process and regulatory takings.45 Nonetheless, the term and concept 
 43. See generally D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 471 (2004). Barros’ analysis of the police power doctrine is thorough and well-reasoned, and we 
draw from it heavily for our summary here. 
 44. Washington State Supreme Court Justice Philip A. Talmadge traces the exercise of the po-
lice power from the ancient Greeks, through English common law, and then to American common law, 
but he notes that ancient history is not cited extensively. Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Abso-
lutism and Modern Government: The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857, 
861-64 (2000). In any case, as observed by Chief Justice Redfield of the Vermont Supreme Court in an 
early influential decision addressing the police power, “It has never been questioned, so far as I know, 
that the American legislatures have the same unlimited power in regard to legislation which resided in 
the British parliament, except where they are retrained by written constitutions.” Thorpe v. Rutland & 
Burlington R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 142 (1855). 
 45. See Barros, supra note 43, which analyzes comprehensively the history, meaning, and impli-
cations of the police power doctrine for the purpose of interpreting the history, meaning, and implica-
tions of the regulatory takings doctrine. He notes that relatively little scholarly attention has been given 
to the origins and development of the police power doctrine, id. at 472, but analyzes at length several  
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serve to articulate the authorities that a state has to enact laws that advance the 
general welfare. In this section, we briefly review its history and implications for 
managing coastal shorelands. 
1.  Historical Origins 
The concept of police power appears to have been first introduced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in early federalism cases as the Court struggled to clarify the rela-
tionships between the powers of the national government and the powers of the 
states. Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden discussed the powers of the state 
“using the term ‘police’ several times, at one point referring to ‘[t]he acknowledged 
power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own 
citizens.’”46 At that time, the word ‘police’ itself had multiple meanings, “used to 
refer broadly to civilization or civil organization, [such that] ‘public police’ meant 
the equivalent of public policy.”47 Justice Marshall subsequently used the term “po-
lice power” in Brown v. Maryland,48 an early decision interpreting the meaning of 
the import-export and commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 
influential works, all written around the turn of the twentieth century, including: THOMAS M. 
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (7th ed. 1903) (arguing in response 
to aggressive state regulation of trade in liquor in the mid-1800s that the police power should be limited 
to regulations addressing nuisance-like harms); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE 
LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (1886) (arguing that the police power 
should be limited to regulations preventing nuisance-like harms based on a laissez faire legal philosophy 
and drawing from the Social Darwinist philosophy of Herbert Spencer); JOHN W. BURGESS, 
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1890) (drawing from political the-
ory to argue that the police power should be conceived as a narrow and local administrative authority 
only); ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 405 
(1904) (an analysis published in a legal treatise but based primarily on political theory, concluding that 
the police power should be limited to regulations addressing nuisance-like harms); W.G. Hastings, The 
Development of Law as Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the Policy Power of the State, 39 PROC. AM. 
PHIL. SOC’Y 359 (1900) (an analysis published in a non-legal journal but based primarily on legal analy-
sis, concluding that the police power is coterminous with the expansive and supreme powers of a state as 
sovereign); Walter Wheeler Cook, What is the Police Power?, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 322 (1907) (concluding 
that Hastings’ analysis was correct and that, because the police power is so broad, it cannot be defined 
or enumerated by what it encompasses but rather by determining when and how it is limited); id., in 
passim. 
 46. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 208 (1824) (establishing that the national gov-
ernment has exclusive power over interstate commerce as provided by the commerce and supremacy 
clauses) quoted in Barros, supra note 43, at 474. Even so, in the process of making that declaration, the 
Supreme Court also began to delineate the powers of the states in juxtaposition to the national govern-
ment. Id. 
 47. Barros, supra note 43, at 475 (citations omitted). Barros further cites as an influential exam-
ple of this understanding “Blackstone’s widely quoted description of the public police as ‘the due regula-
tion and domestic order of the kingdom.’” Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
162 (1769)). 
 48. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827).  
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Given these early cases, a state’s police power is sometimes characterized as 
having originated in the U.S. Constitution, but that characterization is not quite 
accurate. The Constitution did not create the power so much as acknowledge its 
existence. Early U.S. Supreme Court decisions did not explicate its reach and lim-
its for the sake of doing so per se but rather for the purpose of delimiting it relative 
to the enumerated powers of the federal government. In his review of the doctrine, 
Barros49 concluded that the process of defining the meaning of the police power 
from that federalism perspective was resolved by the mid-1800s by two commerce 
clause cases—the License Cases50 and Passenger Cases.51 These decisions differed on 
whether the Commerce Clause and police power were overlapping or mutually ex-
clusive, but the cases agreed that the police power was an expansive power coter-
minous with state sovereignty. In the words of Chief Justice Taney, writing in the 
License Cases: 
But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less 
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the ex-
tent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a 
law to punish offences, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring cer-
tain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own 
limits, in every case it exercises the same powers; that is to say, the power 
of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of 
its dominion.52 
The cases that have more fully explored the reach and limits of the police 
power beyond the question of its relationship to enumerated federal powers have 
been state supreme court decisions. Chief among these was the early Massachusetts 
case of Commonwealth v. Alger,53 decided in 1851. Alger was a coastal case involving 
a dispute over whether the State of Massachusetts had the power to regulate a 
shoreland property owner’s construction of a wharf out into Boston Harbor. In ad-
dition to discussing the applicability and reach of the public trust doctrine, the case 
addressed the question of how expansive a state’s police power prerogatives are 
(i.e., as opposed to the question of the extent to which they are constrained by the 
Federal Constitution).54 The debate in this case, one subsequently continued by 
commentators, has split between the argument that the police power should be in-
terpreted broadly, essentially constrained only by state and federal constitutional 
protections (or legislatively adopted limitations), and the alternative argument that 
the police power should be interpreted very narrowly, essentially encompassing 
 49. Barros, supra note 43, at 476-77. 
 50. Thurlow v. Massachusetts (The License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). 
 51. Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
 52. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 583. 
 53. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). 
 54. Id. at 65.  
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only the power to impose police-force-like regulations on activities that cause nui-
sance-like harms.55 
As first and most clearly articulated by this Massachusetts decision, the scope 
of the police power per se (i.e., as opposed to its relationship to federal powers), was 
“simply the government’s power to enact such regulations for the good and welfare 
of the community as it sees fit, subject to the limitations that the regulations be 
both reasonable and constitutional.”56 Chief Justice Shaw, writing for the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court, decided Alger in a way that adopted the former, expansive 
interpretation.57 Moreover, Alger arguably marked a turning point in the transition 
of the police power from its more common law origins to one of constitutionally 
enabled legislative authority, in that the decision acknowledged that a state exercis-
es its police powers through the legislature and duly enabled administrative agen-
cies, not the state courts.58 
The difficulty with this conceptualization comes with attempts to describe all 
of the things a state might do under such broad authority, as opposed to determin-
ing when the exercise of that authority has somehow become unreasonable or un-
constitutional. Early formulations that attempted to describe the police power have 
now become a routine recitation, such that the police power is generally described 
as the power of the state to regulate individuals or private property for the purpose 
of promoting public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.59 The point to 
take here is that this recitation should be read as illustrative of the authorities 
states enjoy, and not a limitation confining those authorities to these specific 
ends.60 Indeed, both federal courts61 and state courts62 have consistently acknowl-
edged such a broad interpretation since these early cases were decided. 
 55. Id. at 57-64; see also Barros, supra note 43, at 481-82, and following citations. 
 56. Barros, supra note 43, at 479-80 (citations omitted); see Alger, 61 Mass. at 85. 
 57. Alger, 61 Mass. at 84-85. 
 58. Id. at 85. 
 59. See, e.g., JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 43 (3rd ed. 2013). 
 60. See Barros, supra note 43, at 487-88. 
 61. This expansive interpretation of the meaning and reach of the police power has been recog-
nized consistently by the U.S. Supreme Court over time—see, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 
(1954) (“Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quite, law and order—these are some of the 
more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet 
they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.”)—except for a brief period during 
the early 1900s bookended by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York State 
law regulating bakeries for being beyond the state’s police powers) and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 
502 (1934) (upholding a New York state law regulating the price of milk for being within the ambit of 
the state’s police powers and marking the end of the Lochner era). 
 62. In a seminal Michigan Supreme Court decision addressing the authority of home-rule cities 
in Michigan to enact zoning regulations, Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 215 177 N.W. 722, 725 
(1920), for example, the Court explained that:  
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2.  Police Powers as Prerogative 
Thus, the authorities that states enjoy as sovereigns under the police power 
doctrine are unique. The police power creates plenary authorities, circumscribed by 
particularized constitutional and legislative constraints imposed by states them-
selves rather than expounded by exhaustive recitations of what they encompass. 
These authorities are also unique to state governments in that the federal govern-
ment does not enjoy similar powers under the U.S. Constitution.63 Local units of 
government also cannot hold police powers except through delegation.64 As such, 
these authorities are appropriately thought of as prerogatives of the state, in the 
full sense of what that term implies.65 
Even so, there have been instances over time when the states have aggressive-
ly asserted authority in ways that have prompted pushback. Sometimes the result 
of doing so has led to more constraint of state powers. Mid-nineteenth century 
claims of “states’ rights,” pushed to the point of safeguarding private property 
The governmental authority known as the “police power” is concededly an inherent attrib-
ute of State sovereignty. . . . As generally understood it operates in a conceded sphere re-
lating to public safety, order and morals for the protection of health, person and property, 
which is never questioned; but with changing conditions and requirements of our modern 
civilization, increasing regulatory and restrictive legislation has expanded its application to 
new subjects and demands presenting a debatable sphere where compulsory control borders 
the line of claimed constitutional rights and private freedom of action. 
The Court concluded that while the police power authorities the state enjoys and implements through 
its legislature are broad, the full reach of those authorities as exercised by its local units of government, 
particularly with regard to the regulation of private property, must be clearly and specifically delegated. 
Id. 
 63. While there are ongoing debates about whether the broad reach of U.S. law enacted espe-
cially under the commerce clause has gone too far, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear nonetheless 
that the federal government is a government of enumerated powers and that it does not enjoy broad 
authorities to promote the general welfare; it has no inherent police power authority. See United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000) (reaffirming that there is no federal police power). 
 64. See, e.g., JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 59, at 43-48. Although advocates for 
local control may object, it is well-settled law that local units of government, including both municipal 
corporations like cities chartered under state constitutions and local units legally considered extensions 
of the state like counties, are “creatures, mere political subdivisions, of the state, for the purpose of ex-
ercising a part of its powers. . . . They may be created, or, having been created, their powers may be 
restricted or enlarged, or altogether withdrawn at the will of the legislature. . . .” Atkins v. Kansas, 191 
U.S. 207, 220-21 (1903). 
 65. See supra note 30. These authorities are consistent with a state’s powers of eminent domain, 
representing parallel powers that states enjoy as the original sovereigns. See, e.g., JUERGENSMEYER & 
ROBERTS, supra note 59, at 598-606. Indeed, reflecting the very broad reach of authority that states 
enjoy under the police power prerogative to promote the general welfare, the power of eminent domain 
might be thought of as emanating from the police power, or perhaps as a special application of that 
power specifically constrained by federal and state constitutional protections, although that characteriza-
tion is not commonly made. See Barros, supra note 43, at 477. In any event, state or local condemnations 
of privately owned shoreland on Michigan’s Great Lakes do not appear to be a pressing concern, and we 
do not address this doctrine directly for purposes here.  
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rights to own slaves through state law, were nullified by the Civil War and the 13th 
and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, aggressive increases in 
state efforts to regulate the trade in liquor under police power prerogatives were 
incorporated into the U.S. Constitution but then ultimately turned back by popu-
lar demand.66 
In contrast, when contemplating the police power regulation of coastal 
shorelands, states have steadily (if not aggressively) exercised police power prerog-
atives in new ways to adopt a host of so-called economic regulations, including es-
pecially those affecting the use of private property, in order to address a broad ar-
ray of worker safety, public health, and environmental concerns from the late 
nineteenth century on.67 States have similarly exercised the police power to pro-
mote the productive use of resources and enhance commercial activity.68 States 
have also used regulations, along with the adoption of nuisance-like prohibitions, 
to protect and increase the asset values of private property.69 
Indeed, aside from limited early writings that argued for a narrow interpreta-
tion of the police power doctrine,70 and some contemporary legal academic and ad-
vocacy writings arguing for the same,71 there has been no discernable diminishment 
in acceptance by the courts or by other legal commentators that the police power 
doctrine speaks to broad prerogatives to enact laws to promote the general wel-
fare.72 This ability to promote the general welfare includes, but is not limited to, 
police-force-like regulations that address merely the abatement of nuisance-like 
harms, again subject only to the limitation that those regulations be reasonable and 
constitutional. For example, state-enabled local zoning regulations are widely used 
to effect multiple harm-preventing and benefit-enhancing goals, often simultane-
ously, such as: protecting neighboring properties from generating nuisance-like 
harms;73 preventing development within high-hazard zones both to prevent prop-
erty damage and to minimize public disaster recovery expenditures following a 
 66. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 67. The state delegation of police power authorities to local units of government to regulate 
private land use for the general welfare, through enabling acts specifically authorizing local planning 
and zoning, represents a prominent example of this phenomenon. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, 
supra note 59, at 39-48. 
 68. Id. at 48-55. 
 69. Id. at 50-51. 
 70. See Barros supra note 43 at 491-95. 
 71. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 107-45 (1985) (arguing that the police power test should focus exclusively on the 
need to maintain peace and good order); ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT 
DOMAIN 37 (1987). 
 72. See Barros, supra note 43 at 490. 
 73. The leading U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of zoning, Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926), looked especially to this concern.  
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storm;74 regulating development densities in ways that preserve property values;75 
and regulating the form, location, and design of structures in ways that enhance the 
aesthetic and environmental quality of an area.76 
In fact, the real concern is not the limitation of the police power prerogatives 
of the state per se but rather ensuring that state actions are not abusive or tyranni-
cal.77 Thus the primary focus of both the courts and commentators in response to 
public safety, health, environmental, and other general welfare regulations since 
the late nineteenth century, and especially since the latter half of the twentieth 
century, has been on discerning in what ways state and federal constitutional pro-
tections constrain police power prerogatives.78 When contemplating state police 
power prerogatives vis-à-vis private property in particular, those constraints have 
taken form, in turn, primarily through the evolution of the due process, takings, 
and regulatory takings doctrines.79 
The origins and meaning of private property rights and the evolution of these 
doctrines to safeguard them are discussed in more detail below. Before engaging in 
that discussion, it is important to emphasize that the regulation of persons and 
property was not uncommon before the late nineteenth century.80 In fact, police 
 74. This may be accomplished, for example, through the adoption of setback requirements away 
from high-risk flood zones or the imposition of extra-ordinary structural requirements like elevation for 
buildings sited within them. See, e.g., TIMOTHY BEATLEY, DAVID J. BROWER & ANN K. SCHWAB, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 137-46 (2d ed. 2002). 
 75. Low-density zoning, for example, is often used as a way to preserve property values, inter-
preted benignly, while also often serving more problematically to effect racial and/or socio-economic 
segregation. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 59, at 205-32; RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE 
COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 
(2017). 
 76. Regulating for aesthetic purposes like environmental enhancement or historic preservation, 
which often both constrains property owners’ liberty to do what they want with their properties while 
increasing their property values, has long been acknowledged as a valid purpose of zoning. See, e.g., 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, 
supra note 59, at 513-29. 
 77. See Barros supra note 43, at 485-86. See also, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 
74 YALE L.J. 38, 57 (1964), writing on the original understanding of the purpose of the takings clause of 
the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and asserting that: 
What seemed to concern the early writers was not the fact of loss (i.e., that the state had the 
authority to regulate private property in a way that diminished its economic value) but the 
imposition of loss by unjust means. It was the exercise of arbitrary or tyrannical powers that 
were sought to be controlled. 
 78. See infra Section II.C. 
 79. See infra Section II.C. 
 80. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
COMMON GOOD (2003) (providing an explication of extensive regulation of land use throughout the 
course of American history). See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 59, at 40-43, for a discus-
sion of the rise of forward-looking and prophylactic zoning regulations in lieu of back-ward looking and 
reactive of nuisance law.  
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power regulations were common throughout the colonies, and subsequently the 
states, from the very origins of the country.81 These regulations existed to address 
a variety of ends that included both the prevention of nuisance-like harms and the 
promotion of the public welfare.82 Moreover, the continued development of the 
regulatory state since then does not represent a unique or unwarranted divergence 
from either history or common expectations. Rather, regulations and other public 
programs to promote public welfare have evolved in both kind and degree as we 
have learned to better anticipate potential harms that come from various economic 
activities, enhanced our abilities to generate new harms, and grown so populous as 
to require more formal governmental policy and administration.83 Moreover, those 
programs have shifted from more local to state and to federal levels as we have 
worked to better address multi-jurisdictional harms (e.g., water pollution) and 
promote multi-jurisdictional benefits (e.g., interstate commerce).84 
3.  Summary 
In sum, the police power prerogatives of a state, as original sovereign, to enact 
regulations and adopt other programs for the prevention of harms and the promo-
tion of the general welfare are expansive, appropriately conceptualized more in 
terms of constraints put upon the state rather than in terms of enumerating the 
various actions the state can take. Contemporary commentators arguing explicitly 
or implicitly for a narrow read of what a state’s police power prerogatives encom-
pass, perhaps most avidly conveyed by contemporary free-market and limited gov-
ernment advocates,85 make arguments that comport neither with a fair reading of 
American history nor with well-settled doctrinal interpretation of the courts. Ra-
ther, both state and federal courts generally adopt, tacitly if not expressly, a broad 
interpretation of the police power, specifically not limiting that power to police-
force-like regulation of nuisance-like harm alone. These prerogatives are every bit 
as much in force along a coastal shoreline, including a Great Lakes coastal shore-
line, as in any other setting. As a reminder, the purpose of this Article is to assess 
the pedigree and aptness of key doctrines as they play themselves out along Great 
Lakes shores through juxtaposition. Before engaging discussion of constitutional 
constraints on the police power, we look to the second key power at play along a 
coastal shore and the primary focus of this assessment—the public trust doctrine. 
 81. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 59 at 40-43. 
 82. Id. at 573-75. 
 83. See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 80. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 265. 
 85. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 71, at 108-09; BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND 
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATION 1-3 (1997).  
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B.  The Public Trust Doctrine over Coastal Shorelands in General 
The public trust doctrine is commonly presented as a doctrine first articulated 
under ancient Roman law, subsequently incorporated into English common law, 
and then adapted to American common law.86 Intertwined with the navigability 
and the equal footing doctrines,87 the public trust doctrine is recognized today 
primarily as a state-specific doctrine comprised of a hybrid of common, constitu-
tional, and statutory law. The doctrine places classes of natural resources or areas 
into a special protected status, where some title or use interests are held, in trust, 
by the state for the benefit of the people.88 It appeared early in American history 
and is generally considered now to be well settled, at least in coastal settings, alt-
hough it has been contested more recently nonetheless.89 While the doctrine is still 
 86. See, e.g., DAVID C. SLADE ET. AL, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 3-9 
(1990); ROBERT W. ADLER, ROBIN K. CRAIG & NOAH D. HALL, MODERN WATER LAW ch. 7 (2nd 
ed., 2018) [hereinafter MODERN WATER LAW]. 
 87. See MODERN WATER LAW, supra note 86, ch. 6. Navigability relates to the public trust 
doctrine along several dimensions. Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution establishes federal 
jurisdiction over “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In the 
case of Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this authority extends to 
all navigable waters in fact, not just those waters subject to tidal ebb and flow. Propeller Genesee Chief 
v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851). Similarly, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution 
establishes federal authority to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8. In The Daniel Ball, the Court reaffirmed the navigable-in-fact rule for establishing jurisdic-
tion over all waters, including the non-tidal waters of the Grand River in Michigan and Lake Michigan. 
The Daniel Ball, 8 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 557 (1870). Finally, the Court has recognized a federal ‘naviga-
tional servitude’ over navigable waters, Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897), given the 
federal government’s “dominant public interest in navigation,” United States v. Willow River Power 
Co., 324 U.S. 499, 507 (1945). The navigational servitude effectively insulates the federal government 
from otherwise valid regulatory takings claims and places an encumbrance on riparian property owners. 
See MODERN WATER LAW, supra note 86, at 299-305 (providing a thorough discussion of the naviga-
tional servitude). All three of these powers reflect a federal interest in both tidal and non-tidal naviga-
ble waters and their shores, based on federal law, overlapping with corresponding state interests. The 
equal footing doctrine links navigability to the public trust doctrine, particularly for the Great Lakes 
states admitted to the Union after its founding (i.e., those states other than New York and Pennsylva-
nia). See id. at 314-22. Under that doctrine, the states generally hold title to the beds and banks of wa-
ters that met the state title navigability test at the time they entered the union. Id. at 322-23. Thus, 
determining title to submerged lands underlying navigable waters as between the federal and state gov-
ernments is determined by federal law under the equal footing doctrine. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 
565 U.S. 576 (2012). Once the state has title to the bed and banks of a navigable water body, however, 
the boundary lines of the state’s ownership interest as between the state and private shoreland owners is 
a matter of state law, determined under the public trust doctrine. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4 Ot-
to) 324 (1876); MODERN WATER LAW, supra note 86, at 117-21. That interest varies across the states, 
and it is yet the subject of some confusion and disagreement. See infra Section II.B.3. 
 88. See SLADE ET AL., supra note 86, at 3. 
 89. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2007) (providing a recent critique of the doctrine in gen-
eral). For a critique of the Michigan Supreme Court’s most recent adjudication of its public trust doc-
trine specifically, see, e.g., Carl Shadi Paganelli, Note, Creative Judicial Misunderstanding: Misapplication 
of the Public Trust Doctrine in Michigan, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1095 (2007).  
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applied primarily in coastal settings, an influential article published by Joseph Sax 
in 197090 argued for its expansion to encompass natural resources more broadly, 
which has in turn prompted considerable attention by commentators and some 
recognition in state courts.91 We acknowledge that call for expansion of the doc-
trine beyond its original coastal setting along with the responses it has drawn92, but 
we set aside that debate here, focusing our analysis on coastal settings. 
There are several primary issues that the public trust doctrine implicates to-
day, particularly for purposes here. First is the historical pedigree and continued 
validity of the doctrine itself. Second is its application to Great Lakes waters. 
Third is the ownership interest(s) it establishes for both submerged lands and 
shorelands as between the state and private owners. Fourth is the boundary(ies) 
that demarcate the transition from public to private interests. Fifth is the title in-
terest(s), trust duty(ies), and use right(s) it establishes, especially where interests 
overlap. In addition to these specific issues, the doctrine also raises interesting 
questions regarding the appropriate relationship between the judiciary and the leg-
islature in the context of the interplay between common law, constitutional law, 
and statutory law. Probably the greatest concern of critical commentators today, 
whether stated explicitly or not, is the relationship of the public trust doctrine vis-
à-vis the regulatory takings doctrine, and more recently its implications vis-à-vis 
the concept of a judicial taking in a post-Lucas world.93 We summarize these vari-
ous debates broadly here as a prelude to our consideration of them regarding Great 
Lakes shorelands specifically below. 
 90. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 MICH. L. REV. 417 (1970). 
 91. See MODERN WATER LAW, supra note 86. 
 92. The literature both building on and critiquing Sax’s article is voluminous. See, e.g., James L. 
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989) 
(critiquing Sax’s interpretation of the public trust doctrine as a violation the U.S. Constitution’s takings 
clause); cf. Scott W. Reed, Fish Gotta Swim: Establishing Legal Rights to Instream Flows through the Endan-
gered Species Act and the Public Trust Doctrine, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 645 (interpreting the public trust doc-
trine to prioritize use of water for environmental protection over drinking water); see also Michael 
Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 
701 (1995) (discussing how public trust jurisprudence has revolutionized California water law). 
 93. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause through the Myth of Public Rights: The 
Public Trust and Reserve Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171 (1987); David J. 
Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 
(1996); Wolf, supra note 40. See also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 
560 U.S. 702 (2010); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (addressing the question of 
whether a state coastal area management regulation had resulted in a regulatory taking). See infra Sec-
tion II.C.3 for more discussion of this case.  
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1.  Historical Origins 
The ancient text most commonly cited as the original source of the public 
trust doctrine comes from the remaining fragments of Emperor Justinian’s Institutes 
and Digests, which codified Roman law in the late sixth century A.D. toward the 
end of the Roman Empire.94 As detailed below, prominent critiques of the pedi-
gree of the public trust doctrine were made by authors Glenn MacGrady and Pat-
rick Deveney in the 1970s, writing in separate publications.95 Both were based pri-
marily on historical analysis and both speak to the commonly recited—but 
allegedly flawed—interpretation of the Institutes in the context of Roman law more 
broadly. Both authors critique the public trust’s incorporation into English com-
mon law through influential, but allegedly flawed, treatises written in the thir-
teenth and seventeenth centuries. The authors also critique the public trust doc-
trine’s subsequent incorporation into American common law through influential 
treatises and court cases in the early nineteenth century, again allegedly flawed in 
turn for being premised on those earlier flawed recitations of Roman law and Eng-
lish common law. Despite the breadth and depth of these two analyses, definitive 
statements on the precise meaning and validity of ancient Roman and English his-
torical interpretations are questionable, given the long timeframes involved and 
countervailing historical analyses that have been conducted in response to Mac-
Grady’s and Deveney’s separate assessments.96 Nonetheless, because of the promi-
nence of recitations of Roman law and English common law as authority for the 
modern public trust doctrine, we discuss those recitations and the debates sur-
rounding them briefly first. 
In relation to private and public rights at the foreshore, Justinian’s Institutes 
provided the following, in full: 
 94. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
 95. Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Devel-
opment, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 (1975); 
Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 
(1976). While not widely cited by advocates of the public trust doctrine, these two critiques have been 
relied upon heavily by scholars both critical of the public trust doctrine generally, see, e.g., Huffman, 
supra notes 89 & 92-93, and of its application to Great Lakes shores in particular, see, e.g., Paganelli, 
supra note 89. These critiques were published shortly after Sax’s influential article calling for a more 
expansive application of that doctrine. See Sax, supra note 90. 
 96. In his analysis of Michigan’s public trust doctrine, for example, Robert H. Abrams, Walking 
the Beach to the Core of Sovereignty: The Historic Basis for the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. 
Goekel, 40 MICH. J.L. REFORM 861 (2007), disputes much of the historical interpretation of Roman 
law offered by Deveney and MacGrady, and thus subsequently by Huffman, Paganelli, and others, rely-
ing heavily on historical treatments of Roman law and English common law at odds with those interpre-
tations. See, e.g., JAMES HADLEY, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW (D. Appleton & Co. 1873) cited in 
Abrams supra, at 871; PETER N. RIESENBERG, INALIENABILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN MEDIEVAL 
POLITICAL THOUGHT (Colum. Univ. Press 1956) cited in Abrams supra, at 878; HELLEN F. ALTHAUS, 
PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 1978) cited in Abrams supra, at 874; ALAN 
WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW (1991) cited in Abrams supra, at 870.  
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(1) By natural law the following things belong to all men, namely: air, 
running water, the sea, and for this reason the shores of the sea. No one, 
therefore, is prohibited from approaching the seashore if he avoids dam-
aging houses, monuments, and other structures, because they are not, like 
the sea, subject to the Law of Nations. 
(2) All rivers and ports are also public, and therefore the right of fishing 
in a harbor or in streams is common to all. 
(3) The shore of the sea extends to the point attained by the highest tide 
in winter. 
(4) The public use of the banks of rivers is also subject to the Law of Na-
tions, just as the use of the river itself is; and hence anyone has a right to 
secure a vessel to them, to fasten ropes to trees growing there, or to de-
posit any cargo thereon, just as he has to navigate the river itself; but the 
ownership of the same is in those whose lands are adjacent, and therefore 
the trees growing there belong to them. 
(5) The public use of the sea-shore is also subject to the Law of Nations 
in like manner as that of the sea itself, and therefore any person has as 
good a right to build a house there in which he can take refuge, as he has 
to dry his nets or to draw them out of the sea. The ownership of the 
shores, must, however, be considered as belonging to no one, but to be 
subject to the same law as the sea itself and the earth or sand underneath 
it.97 
In addition, it is important to note, as stated by MacGrady: 
Depending upon the translation used, the Institutes defines the landward 
reach of the shore as “the limit reached by the highest winter flood,” as 
“the winter high-water mark,” or as “the highest point reached by the 
waves in winter storms.” Whatever the precise definition, it is clear that 
the Romans conceived of the shore as reaching as far landward as the 
maximum reach of the sea during the season of highest water (i.e. win-
ter).98 
Portions of these fragments of Roman law were first incorporated into formal 
statements of English law with the writings of cleric and jurist Henry de Bracton 
in the mid-thirteenth century, in his De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (The 
Statute and Common Law of England, or On the Laws and Customs of Eng-
 97. J. INST. 2.1.1-.5 (Samuel P. Scott trans., 1932); as reprinted in Abrams, supra note 96, at 871-
72. 
 98. MacGrady, supra note 95, at 531 (citations omitted). MacGrady further states that “it is also 
clear that such a definition would extend the Roman shore further landward than does the current 
American definition, which holds that the landward reach of the shore is measured by the mean high-
tide line.” Id. at 531-32 (emphasis in original).  
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land).99 Bracton declared that English common law at that time, premised at least 
in part on Roman law, held that the sea and seashore were common to all.100 His 
interpretation, drawn from the Institutes and Digests, read in part: 
By natural law these are common to all: running water, air, the sea, and 
the shores of the sea, as though accessories of the sea. No one therefore is 
forbidden access to the seashore, provided he keeps away from houses and 
buildings [built there], for by the jus gentium shores are not common to all 
in the sense that the sea is, but buildings built there, whether in the sea or 
on the shore, belong by the jus gentium to those who build them. Thus in 
this case the soil cedes to the building, though elsewhere the contrary is 
true, the building cedes to the soil.101 
This concept was subsequently recited again by Sir Matthew Hale in his De Jure 
Maris (Law of the Sea), written by Lord Hale sometime around 1667 but not pub-
lished until it was incorporated by Francis Hargrave into his Law Tracts in 1786.102 
Hale stated: 
The shore is that ground that is between the ordinary high-water mark 
and low-water mark. This doth prima facie and of common right belong to 
the king, both in the shore of the sea and the shore of the arms of the 
sea.103 
Hale also devised a schema of three legal interests in coastal areas, drawing from 
Roman law, including: the jus publicum (the rights of the general public, including 
at least an interest in navigation and the public right to access navigable waters, 
arguably inalienable by the crown); the jus privatum (private right to title, which 
may be held by the crown or a private individual); and the jus regium (the royal 
right, or the power of the king as supreme magistrate to manage coastal resources 
for the public safety and welfare—essentially a parallel authority within the context 
 99. Bracton is credited with writing this early and highly influential statement of English com-
mon law, grounded in part on Roman law, sometime around 1256. The first printed edition of this work 
appeared in 1569, and the now standard text of the work was translated by Travers Twiss in 1878; see 
generally the histories offered by authors cited supra note 89 for multiple renditions of Bracton’s work 
and his influence. 
 100. MacGrady, supra note 95, at 555-56 (citations omitted). 
 101. As reprinted in MacGrady, supra note 95, at 555-56 (citations omitted). Jus gentium, a concept 
of natural law under ancient Roman law, refers to law common to all peoples, or the “law of nations,” or 
the “law which all nations use”—a concept wider and more inclusive than modern concepts of “interna-
tional law.” Jus gentium, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (Deluxe 6th ed. 1990). MacGrady notes that this 
recitation recognizes both that the sea and seashore are held common to all—a concept that can be in-
terpreted variously—and that “the soil of the shore can be privately owned, at least by building on it.” 
MacGrady, supra note 95, at 556. 
 102. See MacGrady, supra note 95, at 549. See Section III.A for a discussion of critical analysis of 
Hale’s work. 
 103. As reprinted in MacGrady, supra note 95, at 549-50.  
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of the coastal public trust doctrine to the modern police power prerogatives held by 
the states).104 
Hale and other writers also recognized classifications of res relevant to the 
coast (or “things,” including property, as distinct under Roman law from persons 
or legal actions), drawing again from the Institutes. These included, at the highest 
level, things susceptible to private ownership (res quae in nostro patrimonio) and 
things not susceptible to private ownership (res extra nostrum patrimonium).105 
Things not susceptible to private ownership were further subdivided into things 
that are common to all (res communes), things that are public (res publicae), things 
that belong to corporate bodies of men (res universitatis), and things that belong to 
no one (res nullius).106 
It is worth noting here that MacGrady concludes that the logical interpreta-
tion of this schema of ownership of “things” and threads of law, taken facially, 
would be that the sea, its submerged lands, and the foreshore were considered by 
the Romans to be things either res communes or res nullius—that is, things not sus-
ceptible to private ownership (or, subject to law as jus publicum rather than jus 
privatum interests).107 Even so, MacGrady then explains at length why, at least, 
“one must hedge such a conclusion,” an assertion discussed more below.108 
2.  Incorporation into American Law 
Given this ancient Roman and English historical backdrop,109 these and relat-
ed provisions, rules, and concepts were drawn upon and cited by two of the most 
 104. See Deveney, supra note 95, at 45-46. 
 105. MacGrady, supra note 95, at 518. 
 106. Id. In addition to these concepts of law, there are numerous classifications of things and 
bodies of law that stem from the Roman Empire, detailed at length in the historical treatments of this 
topic. Supra notes 95-96. These various classifications are of interest in understanding the history of 
Roman law, but not so much for understanding the modern American doctrine. They do follow some-
what, however, the helpful conceptualization of different types of ownership interests as classified by 
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 711 (1986), including privately owned land, publicly-owned land, unclaimed commons (i.e., lands 
subject to capture not yet claimed), inherently public lands (i.e., lands not susceptible to private owner-
ship), and lands with overlapping interests. 
 107. MacGrady, supra note 95, at 532-33. 
 108. Id. See infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text for more analysis of MacGrady’s conclu-
sions. 
 109. In addition to discussing an extensive array of classifications of other “things” related to 
oceans and seas, such as flowing rivers and their foreshores, MacGrady, Deveney, and other historians 
discuss at length other common issues or themes relevant for understanding ancient Roman land and 
English common law per se. While important to acknowledge, those issues are not so relevant for under-
standing American common law for purposes here. Chief among these are, first, the so-called “prima 
facie rule,” purportedly holding that conveyances of shoreland property from the crown did not convey 
the foreshore unless expressly granted, and if not granted were thus retrained by the king. This rule, 
crafted by an obscure apologist for the crown in the mid-sixteenth century, was intended more as a  
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prominent American treatise writers of the early nineteenth century—Joseph An-
gell and James Kent. Angell, for example, stated: 
And although the property of the soil is in the Crown, to high-water mark; 
yet the shore, or the land which is between the high and low-water marks, 
is also of common public right. The maxim being, Rex in ea habet proprie-
tatem, sed populous habet usum ibidem necessarium, the king has the proper-
ty, but the people have the necessary use.110 
Similarly, Kent stated, without citation: 
It is a settled principle in the English law, that the right of soil of owners 
of land bounded by the sea, or on navigable rivers, where the tide ebbs 
and flows, extends to high-water mark; and the shore below common, but 
not extraordinary high-water mark, belongs to the public; and in England 
the crown, and in this country the people, have the absolute proprietary 
interest in the same, though it may, by grant or prescription, become pri-
vate property.111 
At about the same time, courts in the United States began to recognize the 
doctrine. First among those was the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1821 decision of 
Arnold v. Mundy.112 That decision, which applied the doctrine to New Jersey’s At-
lantic Ocean coast, interpreted it in a way that essentially synthesized the interpre-
tations of Angell and Kent, just described.113 In doing so, however, the decision 
means to recapture shoreland properties that the king might then re-convey for great profit rather than 
a principled concern for protection of public trust shorelands. See MacGrady, supra note 95, at 552, 560-
67; Abrams, supra note 96, at 882. A second issue commonly discussed was the effect of the Magna Car-
ta of 1215, which established rights of the noble barons as against the king and included prohibitions 
against the erection of certain kinds of fish weirs in the Thames and other important public waters—
provisions interpreted alternatively as either providing evidence of the fact that submerged lands were 
indeed susceptible to private ownership, MacGrady, supra note 95, at 554-55, or evidence of a growing 
public “counterweight to privatization of the shore,” Abrams, supra note 96, at 882. 
 110. JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATER 20 
(1826), as reprinted in MacGrady, supra note 95, at 547-48. 
 111. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 344 (1826), as reprinted in MacGrady, supra 
note 95, at 548-49. 
 112. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 11 (1821). Because colonial courts brought English com-
mon law to the New World, the public trust doctrine may have been widely understood to exist prior to 
this case. One commenter, for example, asserts that the doctrine first appeared in North America as 
early as 1641 through the Body of Liberties, citing to an historical review provided by the 1979 Massachu-
setts Supreme Court decision of Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 
359 (Mass. 1979). That decision noted both that lands below the “ordinary low water mark . . .belonged 
of common right to the king” and that littoral and riparian householders have free fishing and fowling 
rights to those lands and waters unless otherwise appropriated by the government (citations omitted). 
R. Prescott Jaunich, The Environment, the Free Market, and Property Rights: Post-Lucas Privatization of the 
Public Trust, 15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 168, 176-77 (1994). 
 113. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.  
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followed more the notion of absolute public ownership of public trust lands sug-
gested by Kent, if not a more limited public access and use interest suggested by 
Angell. The language employed by Chief Kirkpatrick’s opinion in describing the 
English common law, which the court noted had been incorporated into New Jer-
sey’s common law, was expansive. It has clearly informed subsequent statements of 
the law as conveyed by both sister state supreme courts and the U.S. Supreme 
Court since.114 That description read, in part: 
[T] the navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the 
bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the land under 
the water, for the purpose of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, 
fowling, sustenance, and all other uses of the water and its products (a 
few things excepted) are common to all the citizens, and that each has a 
right to use them according to his necessities, subject only to the laws 
which regulate that use; that the property, indeed, strictly speaking, is 
vested in the sovereign, but it is vested in him not for his own use, but for 
the use of the citizen, that is, for his direct and immediate enjoyment.115 
Following Arnold, the doctrine was then deployed more prominently by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in several mid- to late-nineteenth century cases. Those cases 
included most notably four U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions. First was Martin v. 
Waddell’s Lessee in 1842,116 which first acknowledged the public trust doctrine as a 
doctrine of American common law. Second was Barney v. Keokuk in 1876,117 which 
held that the delineation between state and private ownership along a navigable 
waterway is a matter of state law. Third was Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois in 
 114. E.g., SLADE ET AL., supra note 86, at 6. 
 115. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76-77. Huffman, supra note 89, at 38, has critiqued Kirkpatrick’s render-
ing of English common law, asserting as part of that critique that Kirkpatrick admitted just prior to 
making this statement of law that he had not taken the time to “look into it . . . in so full and satisfacto-
ry a manner as could have been wished.” Id. at 38, n.217 (quoting Kirkpatrick in Arnold, 6 N.J.L at 70). 
Even so, Kirkpatrick himself concluded that he had “nevertheless, so far looked into it as to satisfy my-
self of the principle that must prevail.” Arnold, 6 N.J.L at 70. Arnold was ultimately overruled by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court on other grounds, although subsequent New Jersey cases arguably reinstat-
ed the Arnold rule to some extent. See Deveney, supra note 95, at 56 n.261, and accompanying text. In 
any case, Deveney asserts that the Arnold decision was important historically primarily for is influence 
on the U.S. Supreme Court in rendering its decision of Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee. See infra note 116 and 
accompanying text; Deveney, supra note 95, at 56-58. 
 116. See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 234, 412-13 (1842); THE WILDLIFE SOC’Y, THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 12 (2010). 
 117. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 324, 339 (1876). Most states have subsequently set 
the boundary for demarcating ownership interests at the high water mark or high water line, although 
some states, mostly in the east, use the low water mark or low tide line. See MODERN WATER LAW, 
supra note 86, at 368 (quoting from Florida’s state constitution).  
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1892 (hereinafter Illinois Central),118 which described the Great Lakes as ‘inland 
seas’ and recognized the public trust doctrine as being applicable to them.119 Fourth 
was Shively v. Bowlby in 1894,120 which both reaffirmed that states admitted to the 
Union following the establishment of the U.S. (i.e., including six of the eight Great 
Lakes states) joined on an ‘equal footing’ with the original thirteen states. As a re-
sult, Shively established that Great Lakes coastal states like Michigan enjoyed the 
common law public trust doctrine as had the original thirteen states, and it de-
clared that submerged lands are of great value for the purposes of commerce, navi-
gation, and fishing, and that the title and control of them are therefore vested in 
the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people.121 Reflecting its quick incorpora-
tion into the laws of the Great Lakes states, the public trust doctrine was first 
acknowledged by a Michigan chancery court in 1843, only six years after Michigan 
became a state,122 and it was reaffirmed and clarified by the Michigan Supreme 
Court most recently in 2005.123 
3.  The Contours of Contemporary Public Trust Doctrines 
The public trust doctrine as it has evolved under U.S. law actually consists to-
day of separate doctrines unique to each coastal state, including both the ocean 
coastal and Great Lakes states. While those doctrines vary somewhat, especially in 
terms of elements such as their landward reach, each generally incorporates a core 
 118. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); see also Propeller Genesee Chief v. 
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 453-55 (1852); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382 (1891). Both Gen-
esee Chief and Hardin similarly described the Great Lakes as “inland seas” and recognized the public 
trust doctrine as applicable to them. 
 119. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 435. The Illinois Central decision, written by Justice Field, has been 
especially influential, both in general and with regard to Great Lakes waters in particular. Given its 
influence, this decision has also been heavily critiqued. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Mer-
rill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 799 (2004) (providing a thorough review of the history and issues underlying the Illinois Central 
decision and critiquing both its soundness and subsequent influence). 
 120. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). As noted, Shively re-affirmed the applicability of 
the equal footing doctrine to Oregon, which recognizes in states formed subsequently to the original 13 
“the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject [i.e., submerged lands] as the original 
states.” Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845). Although not addressed further here, the 
equal footing doctrine itself also serves to further substantiate federal recognition of the applicability of 
the public trust doctrine to submerged lands and foreshores under state law, particularly for the Great 
Lakes states by virtue of the Northwest Ordinance. See Noah D. Hall & Benjamin C. Houston, Law 
and Governance of the Great Lakes, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 742-44 (2014). Nonetheless, this doctrine 
has not been much analyzed or criticized as a controversial doctrine as has the public trust doctrine it-
self. See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public Trust Doc-
trines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 121. Shively, 152 U.S. at 57. 
 122. La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co. v. City of Monroe, Walker Chancery Rep. 155, 167-68 (Mich. 
1843). 
 123. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (2005).  
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set of elements.124 We recite those elements here, as commonly understood and 
presented by courts and commentators, then discuss how and why those elements 
have been contested by critical commentators in the following section. 
First and foremost, the various coastal state doctrines distinguish between the 
two property interests at the shore as articulated by Lord Hale, including a private 
ownership interest (jus privatum) and the public trust interest (jus publicum).125 In 
general, either a private party or the state in its proprietary capacity can hold jus 
privatum title interests in submerged lands and shorelands. All of the eight Great 
Lake states appear to own title interest in their submerged lands, with some quali-
fications.126 In contrast, only the state holds the common property jus publicum in-
terest, and it applies to all submerged lands, whether jus privatum title to any given 
land is held by the state or a private party.127 The jus publicum interest may also en-
compass some portion of the shorelands landward of the water’s edge (i.e., up to a 
‘high-water mark,’ ‘ordinary high-water mark,’ or some similar boundary), whether 
defined legally as ‘submerged’ land or something else, depending on the way a par-
ticular state defines its public trust boundary.128 
Second, the public trust interest uniformly consists of the right of the citizens 
of the state to enter and use public trust shorelands for navigation, commerce, fish-
ing, and—increasingly—recreation, although again the precise formulation of those 
rights differs somewhat from state to state.129 The public trust interest thus repre-
sents in effect both a public easement and a private servitude, particularly on lands 
where jus publicum and jus privatum littoral property interests overlap. The ease-
ment consists of the right of the public to use submerged lands and shorelands 
lakeward of the public trust boundary, even those that are privately owned. The 
servitude consists of the burden on the underlying littoral property holder not to 
take actions that would destroy public trust lands or otherwise impede public use 
of the easement.130 
 124. See generally SLADE ET AL., supra note 86; Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public 
Trust in Surface Waters and Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 MICH. J.L. REFORM 907 
(2007); Elaine Sterrett Isely & Victoria Pebbles, U.S. Great Lakes Policy and Management: A Comparative 
Analysis of Eight States’ Coastal and Submerged Lands Programs and Policies, 37 COASTAL MGMT. 197 
(2009). See also the descriptions of the doctrine as discussed by various author within this Article. 
 125. See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying text; SLADE ET AL., supra note 86. 
 126. See Frey & Mutz, supra note 124, at 928. 
 127. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text; SLADE ET AL., supra note 86. 
 128. SLADE ET AL., supra note 86. 
 129. Id. Illinois Central recognized the core use rights protected by the public trust doctrine as 
navigation, commerce, and fishing, while an increasing number of states have modified their doctrines 
to protect additional uses as well, especially recreation. See MODERN WATER LAW, supra note 86, at 
125, 132-33. 
 130. See James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands 
and Beaches without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279 (1998). Titus refers to these interests 
collectively as a “rolling easement” because the easement shifts as the shoreline itself naturally moves. 
Deveney and MacGrady both similarly discuss this notion of a public trust servitude on private  
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Third, the state always serves as trustee of the public trust interest and, as 
such, the state has a duty to safeguard the public trust interest in perpetuity.131 
Courts regularly assert that, as a matter of law, this is a duty that the state cannot 
abdicate, while allowing in practice some latitude for interpreting what that 
means.132 Moreover, states may not as a general rule confer private title interests 
that are superior to public interests in public trust lands, although states may pa-
tent submerged lands to private ownership under certain circumstances.133 
Fourth, recognizing that shorelands are dynamic natural systems, the notion of 
jus privatum is generally recognized as a ‘moveable freehold’ ownership interest 
when it extends to the water’s edge, one capable of both expanding and diminish-
ing given the natural movement of the shoreline over time.134 Short-term changes 
as a result of storms, however, are generally held not to effect changes in property 
boundaries (where the meaning of ‘short-term’ is not well defined).135 This concept 
again appears to be uniform across all of the coastal state doctrines, but it raises 
peculiar problems for Great Lakes states because of the unique attributes of those 
systems, a topic not addressed in more detail here but warranting further study.136 
Finally, these uniform elements notwithstanding, the U.S. Supreme Court 
and all of the coastal states recognize that the public trust doctrine is a state doc-
trine that can be modified either by judicial decision or legislative action, according 
shoreland owner rights under Roman law in terms of “popular injunctions” that might be used to pre-
vent shoreland owners from obstructing access to the public, Deveney, supra note 95, at 23-25, and the 
usufructuary rights enjoyed by riparian or littoral property owners to the public trust resources adjacent, 
MacGrady, supra note 95, at 526-27, although they question the enforceability of those interests in prac-
tice. 
 131. See SLADE ET AL., supra note 86. 
 132. The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, held long ago that that the “State may not . . . 
surrender such public rights [in the use of the public trust] any more than it can abdicate the police 
power or other essential power of government,” see Nedtweg v. Wallace, 237 Mich. 14, 17 (1926), alt-
hough it recognizes the ability of the legislature to modify its public trust duties through statutory pro-
vision. 
 133. Under Michigan law, for example, the state may patent submerged lands and “made” lands 
on the Great Lakes, but only when doing so advances the public trust interest in navigation, Nedtweg, 
237 Mich. at 18, or at the very least will not result in “detriment to the public interest in the lands and 
water remaining,” Obrecht v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 361 Mich. 399, 412-13 (1960). The State of Minneso-
ta, in contrast, allows Great Lakes shoreline littoral property owners to fill and effectively convert state-
owned submerged lands into privately owned upland out “to the point of navigability.” See State v. 
Slotness, 289 Minn. 485, 487 (1971). In addition, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that sub-
merged lands patented by the U.S. government to shoreland property owners before Michigan became 
a state are not subject to the public trust doctrine, if the patent makes clear the intent that the shoreline 
boundary of the property in question does not move as the shoreline moves, because those conveyances 
are superior to state law. See Klais v. Danowski, 373 Mich. 262 (1964). That decision appears to apply 
narrowly to only such properties, however, and it has created some ambiguities that the Michigan courts 
have not subsequently addressed—a topic for further study. See infra Part IV. 
 134. See SLADE ET AL., supra note 86, at 92 (quoting Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 219 (1930)). 
 135. See id. at 91. 
 136. See discussion framing this issue infra Part IV.  
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to the best interests of the public.137 Thus, the doctrine may evolve over time to 
adapt to changing circumstances, and states may alter or replace the common law 
public trust doctrine with a statutory scheme. Accordingly, the doctrine itself can 
differ from one state to the next, and sometimes within a single state from one 
time period to the next. 
Given that room for state-specific adaptation, a key dimension along which 
the public trust doctrine varies from state to state is the geographic scope or spatial 
extent of the public trust interest. That is, on any given shore, what are the appro-
priate boundaries to mark jus privatum and jus publicum interests, and are those 
boundaries coincident or can public and private interests overlap?138 As noted 
above, the doctrine is generally taken to have its historical roots in Roman civil and 
English common law, where it originally applied to tidal waters that rose and low-
ered over the course of a day.139 The public trust interest was thus taken to encom-
pass the bottomlands of tidal waters up to some point related to the tide, typically 
the ‘ordinary high water mark,’ or the point on the land to which the high tide or-
dinarily reached—although again the states vary in how they determine where that 
mark falls along the shore.140 One challenge in adapting the public trust doctrine to 
the Great Lakes is that the Great Lakes are not tidal.141 Even so, the standing wa-
ter levels of the Lakes fluctuate periodically with some degree of regularity over 
 137. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894): 
The foregoing summary of the laws of the original States shows that there is no universal 
and uniform law upon the subject; but that each State has dealt with the lands under the 
tide waters within its borders according to its own views of justice and policy, reserving its 
own control over such lands, or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations, 
whether owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it considered for the best interests of the 
public. Great caution, therefore, is necessary in applying precedents in one State to cases 
arising in another. 
There is a federal role here too, but one limited primarily to navigation on waters of the U.S. The U.S. 
Submerged Lands Act of 1953 recognizes coastal states’ powers to manage, administer, lease, develop 
and use the lands beneath navigable waters within each state’s boundaries. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(2) 
(2006). It also defines the landward boundary of submerged lands as the ordinary high water mark, 43 
U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (2006), and it vests the states with title and rights to the natural resources on or 
within those lands, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1) (2006), although it maintains the federal government’s au-
thority to regulate certain offshore activities for flood control, power production, national defense, in-
ternational affairs, commerce, and in particular navigation, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311(d), 1314(a) (2006). See 
MODERN WATER LAW, supra note 86; see also supra note 87. 
 138. The Appendix to this Article illustrates variation on these boundaries across the eight Great 
Lakes states. 
 139. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
 140. See SLADE ET AL., supra note 86; Titus, supra note 130. As noted, supra note 98, Roman law 
may even have recognized a boundary more landward than that typically recognized by most American 
states to the extent it appeared to reach to the extreme of the highest winter tide. 
 141. See Norton et al. supra note 19, at 527.  
 
NORTON_MEA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2019  3:21 PM 
442 Michigan Journal of  Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 8:2 
longer periods of time.142 Each of the Great Lakes states has had to confront the 
questions of what constitutes the appropriate jus publicum boundary along its Great 
Lakes shorelines, given longer-than-tidal periods of lake-level fluctuation, and 
whether that boundary is coterminous or overlapping with the jus privatum bounda-
ry—a source of great confusion in litigation for all of the Great Lakes states. Be-
fore discussing that issue in detail, we first address contemporary critiques of the 
public trust doctrine in general. 
4.  Historical Pedigree and Contemporary Doctrine Contested 
As noted, the historical origins and progression of the public trust doctrine 
presented here have been thoroughly critiqued. The most thorough of those cri-
tiques, specifically in terms of historical scholarship, were offered by commentators 
MacGrady and Deveney in the mid-1970s.143 Both authors were motivated by their 
conclusions, apparently reached independently, that the commonly portrayed ped-
igree of the doctrine in terms of its Roman law and English common law origins 
was not entirely accurate.144 More recent commentators, coming expressly from a 
free market/limited government/strong private property rights school of thought, 
have revived and relied upon those critiques, citing MacGrady and Deveney to 
undermine the doctrine’s validity, but focusing their concerns more on its implica-
tions for contemporary jurisprudence.145 
MacGrady conducted his analysis as a scholarly exercise of problematizing the 
common practice by courts and treatise writers of reciting Roman law, civil law, 
and English common law in their efforts to demonstrate the solid historical foun-
dations of the doctrine.146 He was concerned about how that collective interpreta-
tion had underlain concepts of navigability in American law since its origins, and 
about how that concept of navigability and the earliest portrayals of the public 
trust doctrine had in turn informed the evolution of the doctrine itself in American 
law over time.147 
As MacGrady notes, a plain reading of the fragments of the Institutes and Di-
gests commonly used to justify the origins of the doctrine suggests that the Romans 
considered the sea and its foreshore to be things common to all (res communes) and 
 142. Id. at 528 (“Rather, Great Lakes water levels and shorelines fluctuate to a much greater ex-
tent and over much longer periods of time because of changing climatic and geophysical conditions.”). 
 143. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. MacGrady, supra note 95, at 605-15. The author’s biography states that the article was sub-
mitted as his thesis for the L.L.M. degree at Harvard University. Id. at 513. 
 147. See MacGrady, supra note 95, at 606 (asserting that laws and doctrines of navigability and 
public trust originated from problematic understandings of Roman law and English common law, and 
were “shaped by a process of invention, misconception, manipulation, personal reputation, and by trea-
tise writing”).  
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not susceptible to private ownership.148 He asserts, however, that such a conclusion 
should be “hedged,” for two reasons: first, that at least some of the fragments re-
maining were not uniformly consistent but rather waivered in terms of treating the 
shore as res publicae (owned by the state) or res communes (common to all); and sec-
ond that other provisions in the Institutes made it quite clear that Roman law at 
least “tolerated appropriations of the seashore in the nature of private owner-
ship.”149 MacGrady suggests further that the Institute’s statement that the sea and 
its foreshores are things “common to all” might be interpreted alternatively as an 
application of the rule of capture; that is, to mean that shores at that time were an 
as-yet unclaimed commons—land open to anyone to settle and claim, thus privat-
ized at that point—rather than land not susceptible to private ownership altogeth-
er.150 
Deveney similarly approached his analysis in order to problematize the popu-
lar use of Roman law and English law origins as the foundation for the modern 
public trust doctrine, asserting that “this judicial history has been very much an ad 
hoc affair and its use often substituted for or obscured analysis of the real interests 
competing for the coastal areas.”151 Devaney provides much the same historical re-
view as that provided by MacGrady, including detailed assessments of Bracton’s 
and Lord Hale’s contributions to the English common law. He also asserts, as does 
MacGrady, that both treatise writers construed strong statements of a public trust 
under Roman law that were not adequately supported by the Institutes and Digests, 
and that perhaps those interpretations betrayed the treatise authors’ ideological be-
liefs more so than good statements of English common law as it existed at the 
times they wrote, respectively.152 
Deveney states a concern that American courts have used statements of Ro-
man law and English common law to assert public trust doctrine principles that are 
too formalistic and absolute, using the language of the Institutes to draw hard, 
bright-line interpretations of the meaning of the public trust doctrine today.153 He 
also asserts that the courts in particular have relied on those strong interpretations 
of ancient texts as a deus ex machina to avoid the difficult task of reconciling com-
 148. Supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. 
 149. MacGrady, supra note 95, at 532-33. 
 150. Id. at 533-34. 
 151. Deveney, supra note 95, at 15. This article provides no background information regarding 
the author. However, a short biography on the web indicates that Deveney earned a master’s degree in 
the history of religions at the University of Chicago, then studied law at the State University of New 
York at Buffalo School of Law, where he served as editor-in-chief of the Sea Grant Law Review. He 
subsequently spent his career in the public and private practice of law, specializing in real estate, see John 
Patrick Deveney Biography, CHEHEBAR & DEVENEY LLP, http://www.cdlawllp.com/Site/Deveney.html 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2018), but apparently never published scholarly work on this or related topics again. 
This article was the first in what comprised the inaugural edition of that journal. 
 152. Deveney, supra note 95, at 36-48. 
 153. Deveney, supra note 95, at 13-15.  
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peting principles that arise in the especially complex setting of coastal resources—a 
task he asserts is one better suited to the legislative branch.154 Finally, building on 
the latter concern, Deveney concludes that the judiciary steps too far into the legis-
lative realm through its imposition and exercise of the doctrine, particularly when 
making public policy through judicial decree.155 
Taken together, both MacGrady and Deveney seem to have been most con-
cerned about one substantive legal question: whether under either the Roman law 
or English common law version of the public trust doctrine, title ownership to 
submerged lands held by the government was indeed inalienable. If true, that ques-
tion would suggest that under American law, a given state’s ownership of its sub-
merged lands should be inalienable as well. Both MacGrady and Deveney demon-
strate that under Roman law and English common law, it was legal and accepted 
that some level of ownership interest to some portion of coastal shoreland could be 
conveyed into private hands. Not so clear, however, is the precise relationship that 
remained as between public and private interests in cases of overlap, and what im-
plications those relationships should have in the American context today. 
5.  Synthesis 
Like the police power, the public trust doctrine stems from the inherent sov-
ereignty of a state.156 Unlike the police power, the public trust doctrine traces its 
historical pedigree back to ancient Roman law and English common law, at least in 
terms of the recording of clear statements of law in early texts.157 Premised on 
those ancient statements, it appeared early in this country’s history, and it has been 
acknowledged and incorporated by all of the country’s oceanic and Great Lakes 
states as applicable to their coastal shores.158 
Nonetheless, as with debates over the nature and scope of the police power,159 
commentators like Deveney and MacGrady,160 and more recently others relying 
uncritically on Deveney and MacGrady,161 have leveled strong critiques against the 
public trust doctrine, whether as confined historically to coastal settings more nar-
rowly or as recently promoted to encompass natural resources more expansively. 
But juxtaposing the work of these commentators against the historical analyses of 
 154. Id. at 80-81. 
 155. Id. The issue of separation of powers in particular is addressed in more detail below. See 
infra Section II.C. 
 156. See supra Section II.A. 
 157. See supra Section II.A.; see also supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text. 
 158. See infra Appendix A. 
 159. See supra Section II.A. 
 160. Supra note 95. 
 161. Supra note 89.  
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other scholars who have reached different conclusions,162 makes clear that defini-
tive statements on how the ancient Romans and second-millennial English under-
stood public and private interests at the shore are, at best, contestable. Even so, 
this research does clearly show that the Romans and English recognized and ac-
cepted (or at least ‘tolerated’) that some interests in submerged coastal lands and 
their foreshores were susceptible to private ownership.163 
Finally, even critical historical scholarship clearly shows that while the public 
trust doctrine has tentacles reaching back to ancient Roman and English common 
law, our adoption of its principles has in fact always been truly American. It was 
adapted from the very genesis of the United States to the peculiar settings, con-
cerns, understandings, and imperatives of the unique American context. Since first 
articulated by American courts, it has always been understood to arise from Ameri-
can common law, citations to Roman law and English common law notwithstand-
ing. Aside from our reverence for private property, discussed more below, it is 
hard to imagine an American legal doctrine more well-settled. 
Given all that, several conundrums remain. The first is how to reconcile com-
peting demands over a resource that has historically been recognized as “common 
to all” but simultaneously susceptible to privatization. Second, if the status of 
“common to all” implicates some duty on the part of the state to protect the public 
interest, how do we reconcile the principle that that public trust duty is one that 
even a state’s legislature cannot abrogate (i.e., one safe-guarded by the courts),164 
on one hand, with the competing principle that the public trust doctrine is a state-
specific doctrine amenable to adaptation over time (i.e., presumably enabling legis-
latures to do so),165 on the other. The third is whether there is any meaningful dif-
ference in ownership interests to be drawn between submerged lands that are con-
tinuously submerged and those only periodically submerged (i.e., the foreshore). 
The third of these queries is especially relevant in the context of non-tidal in-
land seas like the Great Lakes, where portions of foreshore are absolutely sub-
merged for sufficient periods of time such that they are not amenable to permanent 
development or cultivation, yet dry for sufficient periods of time that they can 
support ephemeral vegetation and appear to be above high water if not accreting. 
We note the importance and challenges posed by that question but leave it for fu-
ture study. The answers to these queries rest in how the public trust doctrine itself 
has been understood in pragmatic application, rather than how it has been charac-
terized as a theoretical proposition by treatise writers and by the courts in justify-
ing their decisions. 
There are two versions of the public trust doctrine, a strong version and a 
weak version. The strong version is captured by treatise writer Angell’s explanation 
 162. Supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 163. Supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 164. Supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. 
 165. Supra note 137 and accompanying text.  
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of the doctrine,166 Massachusetts Justice Kirkpatrick’s recitation of it in 
nold,167and U.S. Supreme Court Justice Field’s corresponding recitation in Illinois 
Central.168 It suggests that the state holds all interests in submerged lands up to the 
high-water mark, in fee as a proprietor and as trustee of the public trust, and that 
both of those ownership interests are inalienable. The weak version is more akin to 
treatise writer Kent’s169 recitation of the doctrine, and indeed more consistent with 
the doctrine as actually structured by the states through constitutional and statuto-
ry provision, as well as actual resolution of disputes through case law.170 This ver-
sion thus appears to admit to the possibility that title ownership of submerged 
lands (and shorelands) can be conveyed into private ownership, but it requires that 
such conveyances always remain impressed by a public trust easement that recog-
nizes and allows for continued common access and use, as well as a corresponding 
servitude on the shoreland property preventing exercise of that easement, both 
within reason. 
Clearly the ancient Romans, the medieval English parliament, and the Ameri-
can coastal states have always allowed for privatization of shorelands, but these en-
tities have also recognized a compelling overlying public interest in safeguarding 
common access to that shore.171 It is evident in the decisions rendered by the 
coastal states as applied and developed through statute.172 Similarly, considering 
the practical application of the several state public trust doctrines taken collective-
ly, it has been a doctrine that—rather than establishing absolute, exclusive, and 
immutable dominions to coastal shores—has recognized and endeavored to harmo-
nize the complex and overlapping private and public interests that have always ex-
isted at the interface between land and sea. Strong statements of the doctrine may 
animate its presentation by courts and advocates, but the weak version of the doc-
trine better describes its contours in pragmatic application. 
Thus, to answer the first conundrum stated above, it appears well-settled un-
der American law that the public trust doctrine, however adapted by a given state, 
recognizes that title interest to submerged and coastal shorelands can indeed be 
held in private hands, but at least some portions of those lands remain common to 
all, depending on the particulars of that state’s doctrinal law. The fact that these 
doctrines may vary across states or over time in terms of how they balance public 
and private interests at the shore does not mean that the doctrines are flawed or 
unworkable. This fact simply reflects the complexity and competing interests in-
herent in dynamic coastal settings, as well as the unique historical, cultural, natural, 
 166. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 170. See SLADE ET AL., supra note 86, at 3-9. 
 171. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
 172. See infra Part IV.  
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and other place-specific contexts in which states have had to reconcile those com-
peting interests over time. 
Setting aside strong formalistic statements of doctrinal rules in legal decisions 
and looking at the application of those rules in practice similarly offers some in-
sight into the second conundrum noted above—the nature of the duties that coastal 
states bear under their public trust doctrines. We first consider the preeminent 
federal court decision that articulated the doctrine in the strongest terms and then 
applied it to the Great Lakes specifically—the Illinois Central decision, and then 
reconsider that case in light of our assessment of the public trust doctrine above.173 
The dispute that landed Illinois Central in federal court was not whether the public 
trust doctrine actually existed but rather the question of whether the Illinois Legis-
lature had violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution when it revoked 
its prior grant of submerged lands to that railroad company.174 What seemed to 
trouble the Court above all else was not that the legislature had conveyed title in-
terest to Great Lakes shoreland to a private entity per se, but rather that it had giv-
en away so much land in one conveyance, in a rash, irresponsible, and possibly cor-
rupt way.175 From that perspective, the interest at issue is better conceived as the 
inalienability of the res regium—the authority and corresponding duty the state has 
to protect reasonable common use of coastal shorelands for the public interest, not 
the fee title interest to the submerged lands themselves.176 Moreover, the tensions 
that may exist between the legislative and the judiciary in discerning the meaning, 
content, and particulars of the public trust doctrine is perhaps best viewed in a way 
similar to contemporary constitutional adjudication where the courts do not set 
policy through the doctrine but serve as a check, ensuring that the legislature acts 
reasonably and fairly in doing so.177 
The public trust doctrine is on par with the police power prerogative. It does 
not represent a duty that the state maintains title possession of submerged lands 
and foreshores in fee in order to make those lands available for public use. Rather, 
it imposes a duty on the state to strike a balance, one that ensures that the public 
interest in common access and use of coastal resources is reconciled in a meaning-
ful and fair way with the private interests and rights of littoral shoreland owners. 
 173. See supra note 118; see also supra Section II.B. 
 174. Deveney, supra note 95, at 59-63. 
 175. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 119; see also Deveney, supra note 95, at 59-63. 
 176. Deveney, supra note 95, at 59-63. This interpretation is perhaps a stretch, given the strong 
language used by the Illinois Central court, which describes the state’s fee interest in submerged lands as 
being inalienable, and it has not been repeated widely by commentators citing to Deveney’s work since. 
Even so, after asserting as an initial proposition that a state’s fee interests are inalienable, the Illinois 
Central Court made clear that those interests could nonetheless be conveyed when the legislature de-
termines that doing so will enhance, or at least not impinge, the public trust access and use rights to 
those lands. It also relied expressly on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reference to the jus regium in 
Arnold to justify its characterization of the public trust doctrine. Id. at 61. 
 177. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
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The public trust doctrine, like the police power prerogative, empowers the state 
legislature to adopt policies that effect such a balance between public and private. 
It similarly imposes a duty on the courts to ensure that the legislature does not 
shirk that responsibility. The full implication of this characterization is discussed 
more below, following discussion of the relationship between legislatures and 
courts in the context of private property rights. 
C.  The Private Property Doctrine in Juxtaposition 
Compared to scholarly and judicial attention to police power prerogatives and 
the public trust doctrine, concerns regarding the safeguarding of private property 
rights in the American system have received considerably more treatment else-
where, necessitating less explication here.178 As noted, the protections of private 
property against unduly harsh regulation are considered separate doctrines, includ-
ing most notably the due process and regulatory takings doctrines emanating from 
the Due Process and Takings clauses of the U.S. Constitution.179 These doctrines 
are not generally referred to as a single, coherent ‘private property doctrine.’ 
Nonetheless, we refer to them collectively as one here. To situate the balance that 
courts and legislatures strike today along coastal shores between their police power 
and public trust authorities vis-à-vis private property rights, we briefly frame con-
temporary debates on how they resolve those tensions in general. 
1.  Contemporary Debates and Historical Origins 
Since before the founding of the United States, debates over the proper man-
agement and use of land revolved around two broad initial propositions. The first 
is that private property rights are entirely social constructs that exist only because 
society creates and enlivens such rights.180 More pointedly, private property rights 
exist because the state confers those rights upon the property owner, leading to the 
implication that what the state gives the state can take away. The second is that 
private property land ownership is mostly established through capture and posses-
sion, rather than merely being recognized as a social convenience, and that the state 
 178. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); 
Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1638-40 (1988); Wolf, supra note 40. 
 179. See generally JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 59, at 390-445 (discussing federal 
and state takings and due process protections); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 2.01-2.38 
(5th ed. 2003) (discussing federal and state takings protections); id. §§ 2.39-2.43 (discussing federal and 
state due process protections); GERALD A. FISHER ET AL., MICHIGAN ZONING, PLANNING, AND 
LAND USE 265-85 (2016) (discussing constitutional limitations on land use regulation in Michigan). 
 180. See, e.g., JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 59, at 1-9 (framing the broad contours of 
these debates in a land use regulatory and development management context); see also FREYFOGLE, 
supra note 80 (employing a socially constructed view of private property).  
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exists first and foremost to protect those pre-existing private property rights rather 
than to create them.181 From this perspective, private property is not conferred by 
the state, and thus cannot be taken by the state, at least not without compensation. 
This core debate has been evident throughout the history, animated periodically by 
writings and calls for more socialistic approaches to property,182 as well as the 
prominence of neoliberal economic theorizing.183 It also tracks fairly closely, alt-
hough not conterminously, with arguments advanced by advocates for expansive 
police powers and public trust rights, on the one hand, in opposition to those ad-
vanced by advocates for strong private property rights, on the other. 
Despite periodic waves of anti-communistic turmoil, as well as frequent rhe-
torical flourishes in both academic writings and the popular press about the poten-
tial for abuse by the state, extreme calls for the communal ownership of property 
have never held much sway in the American context.184 In contrast, arguably ex-
treme positions about the sanctity of private property rights and the corresponding 
need for a limited role for the state in order to safeguard them have been fairly 
common.185 These latter positions have been grounded in strong but contestable 
assertions about the justifications underlying the formation of the country in the 
first place, as well as strong assertions about the theoretical justifications for ensur-
ing a private property owner’s dominion over his or her property, particularly from 
a neoclassical economic framing.186 
 181. See generally FREYFOGLE, supra note 80; EPSTEIN, supra note 71 (employing the view that 
private property exists prior to the state). A recent Texas Supreme Court decision adjudicating a coastal 
dispute adopted an absolute pre-societal characterization of private property rights, stating “Private 
property rights have been described ‘as fundamental, natural, inherent, inalienable, not derived from the 
legislature and as pre-existing even constitutions.’” Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. 
2012) (citation omitted). We have not found a single state court decision among those relating to Great 
Lakes coastal shoreland disputes, all assiduously respectful of private property rights, that adopted such 
a similarly absolute characterization even so. 
 182. See, e.g., WILLIAM GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (1879). 
 183. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
 184. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 182, a text that has been widely read but that has not prompt-
ed widespread economic policy reform. 
 185. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 71; SIEGAN, supra note 85; contra, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 
80; Glendon, supra note 30. 
 186. Such assertions draw from a school of thought built initially on the economic theorizing by 
Hayek, Samuelson, Coase, Stigler, and others; incorporated subsequently into legal theorizing by Pos-
ner, Calabresi, and others; and now offered as an established component of legal education (e.g., Harri-
son). See, e.g., HAYEK, supra note 183; PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1947); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (1966); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (5th ed. 1998); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION (2016); JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES (2002). They are frequently 
repeated by contemporary theorists speaking to the public trust doctrine and the use of natural re-
sources. See, e.g., Huffman, supra notes 89, 92, 93. But Hayek’s and others’ read on economic theory 
and the state is neither universally accepted nor unassailable, either historically or theoretically. See, e.g., 
GEORGE, supra note 182; KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND  
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The historical origins of strong private property rights in the American con-
text seem to fall chronologically somewhere between the origins of the public trust 
doctrine and the police power prerogative. By far the most prominent authority 
today for the strong protection of sacred, pre-societal private property rights is 
John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, first published in the late 1600s.187 
Locke’s thesis was a philosophical argument, framed more as an apology justifying 
the rights of England’s landed baronies as against the king, rather than as a justifi-
cation for absolute private dominion over land in America.188 Even so, that philos-
ophizing clearly informed the thinking of the founders of the country as they justi-
fied independence from the English crown, devised a new American system of 
representative democracy, and incorporated protections of private property into 
that system.189 While not cited much today, political thinkers and jurists early in 
American history looked to William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land, written in the latter 1700s, to understand what English common law had been 
imported into the American system.190 Unlike Locke’s treatises, Blackstone’s com-
mentary was presented as a restatement of English common law rather than as phi-
losophy. 
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2001). Even mainstream economists contest the ways in which 
foundational law and economics theories such as the “Coase Theorem” have been misconstrued for 
ideological purposes rather than based on sound historical or analytical scholarship. Deirdre McCloskey, 
The So-Called Coase Theorem, 24 EASTERN ECON. J. 367 (1998); Glenn Fox, The Real Coase Theorems, 27 
CATO J. 373 (2007). Similarly, dogmatic assertions about the benefits of a strong private property rights 
regime, such as the idea that privatization will ensure the long-term conservation of natural resources 
and that private property necessarily serves the public interest (i.e., one consisting strictly of the aggre-
gation of private interests), are incorrect factually and debatable philosophically. RICHARD N.L. 
ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES (1999); Mark Sagoff, Some 
Problems with Environmental Economics, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DIVERGENCE AND 
CONVERGENCE (Susan J. Armstrong & Richard G. Botzler eds., 1993); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of 
the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Mark Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Politi-
cal Questions Are Not All Economic, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1283 (1981). 
 187. John Locke, Chapter V: Of Property, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett, 
ed., New Am. Library rev. ed. 1965) (1690). 
 188. See, e.g., ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 14-16 (1984) (arguing that 
Locke was concerned with refuting absolutism and the derivation of ownership rights from sovereigns); 
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Locke and Limits on Land Ownership, in POLICY FOR LAND: LAW AND 
ETHICS 65 (Lynton Keith Caldwell & Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, eds., 1993) (criticizing both abso-
lutist capitalist and Marxist interpretations of Locke). Locke was aware that the New World had been 
discovered and was awaiting settlement, and that knowledge may have influenced his thinking, but his 
theorizing appears to have been mostly motivated by and directed to political debates occurring in Eng-
land at the time. 
 189. See RYAN, supra note 188, at 14-48; JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE SOCIAL COMPACT, 
EXEMPLIFIED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 29 (1842). 
 190. See MARY ANN GLENDON, supra note 30, at 18-25. While Blackstone’s influence was under-
stood in a more nuanced way given the context at the time of the country’s founding, his assertions are 
frequently over-stated in a dogmatic way and out of context today, if cited at all.  
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In any case, just like the historical pedigrees underlying the police power pre-
rogative and the public trust doctrine, the private property doctrine as understood 
in American law today traces its origin to principles of English common law, but it 
is a uniquely American doctrine. It was first fully articulated through American 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and it has since evolved via amendments 
and adjudication as legislatures and courts have continually attempted to balance 
public and private interests in the American context. Given that backdrop, the 
American legal doctrine of private property rights can be understood by consider-
ing its pragmatic implementation through now well-settled adjudicatory doctrines. 
2.  The Contemporary Private Property Doctrine 
In brief overview, the drafters of the U.S. Constitution first established a via-
ble national government by enumerating its powers to act.191 In doing so, the 
drafters sought to check its potential for abuse by creating a series of checks-and-
balances, including the separation of powers between co-equal branches of gov-
ernment. Then they incorporated additional protections through the Bill of Rights, 
including the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause.192 Each of the several 
states similarly adopted constitutions that memorialized the authority to govern as 
sovereigns, constrained the potential for abuses by governmental authorities 
through structural checks-and-balances, and further constrained the potential for 
abuse through statements of individual rights paralleling those in the U.S. Consti-
tution.193 
Without reviewing the extensive case histories or academic theorizing on these 
separate doctrines, courts initially assume deference toward the legislature and ex-
ecutive when considering alleged violations of private property rights.194 Moreo-
ver, the adjudicatory tests employed in assessing alleged violations are effectively, 
if not explicitly, ad hoc balancing tests that take account of the context of a given 
dispute.195 Together, that posture and those tests require petitioners to prove to a 
court that a governmental regulation or other action has been abusive, rather than 
requiring that government prove to the court, as an initial matter, the necessity for 
its actions. That adjudicatory approach is reversed only under extreme circum-
stances.196 The modern adjudicatory approach thus reflects a combined judicial re-
 191. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 192. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 193. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. I § 17; id. art. X § 2. 
 194. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-97 (1926) (holding that when a 
local zoning regulation can be reasonably justified, the courts will defer to the local legislature in adjudi-
cating a due process claim). 
 195. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (establishing a 
three-part ad hoc balancing test for adjudicating regulatory takings claims).  
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spect for the preeminent role played by the legislature in making public policy, 
along with the need to adjudicate difficult property-related disputes in context. 
This deferential approach is entirely conversant with the separation of powers 
as between the branches of government. It advances especially the notion that 
courts ought not implement public policies better left to representative legislatures 
and the political process through the guise of constitutional review, while at the 
same time retaining an essential role for the courts in assessing whether legislative 
acts have unlawfully abdicated duties owed to the public. It is also consistent with 
well-reasoned historical review of the original justifications of the due process and 
takings clauses themselves; that is, that those protections exist to ensure that gov-
ernments exercise their duly enabled authorities fully and appropriately, while also 
doing so fairly and justly.197 
3.  Regulatory Takings and Judicial Takings Along Coastal Shorelands 
Due process protections work to ensure that government does not become ty-
rannical by requiring that governmental actors provide appropriate justifications 
for actions taken. Takings and regulatory takings protections restrict the govern-
ment by “bar[ring] [it] from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”198 Giv-
en those protections, there is an aspect of the regulatory takings doctrine that is 
especially relevant regarding the public trust doctrine as it applies to coastal 
shorelands—the notion of a judicial taking. 
Justice Antonin Scalia made clear that his understanding of private property 
and the state was one that comports with a philosophy of strong private property 
rights rather than the notion that private property rights are socially construct-
ed.199 Justice Scalia was also a proponent of the argument that the federal courts 
should be enabled to find that a state supreme court’s adjudication of its own state 
laws affecting the use of private property could be found to effect a regulatory tak-
 196. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (finding that a regulation adopted by the 
City of Tigard, OR, resulted in a regulatory taking because the property interest demanded of the peti-
tioner through a dedication requirement far exceeded the harm the city purported to address through 
that dedication). 
 197. See Sax, supra note 77; see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 80. Similarly, on his way to present-
ing his take on the original understanding of the takings clause, Kmiec asserts that the “original under-
standing” of private property was that it serves the “constitutional aim of insulating individual citizens 
from arbitrary or disproportionately burdensome exercises of governmental power, but . . . does not 
deny the existence of that power.” Kmiec, supra note 178, at 1640. 
 198. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 199. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636-37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(Justice Scalia concurring and arguing that a change in title should not operate to invalidate an other-
wise viable regulatory taking claim); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 319 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Justice Scalia joining the majority in 
holding that a regulation can effect a temporary taking).  
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ing if too disruptive of the property owner’s expectations.200 Such a finding would 
be called, if recognized, a “judicial taking.”201 
Even Justice Scalia recognized that owning private property does not give one 
absolute dominion to use it, at least to the point of creating nuisance-like harms to 
neighbors or the larger community through common law private and public nui-
sance. Justice Scalia’s approach to reconciling that tension, however, was to concep-
tualize the extent of the right to use one’s property in terms of the extent of title 
interests recognized under the common law.202 That is, rather than acknowledging 
that property rights are socially constructed by the people, particularly when acting 
through a legislature, Scalia preferred to conceptualize property rights as being ju-
dicially constructed by appellate judges as they act to safeguard claims to owner-
ship made by private individuals. Under this reasoning, because at common law 
one does not have a right to use one’s property so as to create a nuisance, the or-
ganic title interest one has in that property does not encompass such uses. Thus, if 
one never had the right to such use in the first place, a regulation merely codifying 
that prohibitory rule cannot effect a regulatory taking; there was no interest pre-
sent in the first place to have been taken. This reasoning informed Justice Scalia’s 
proviso in the Court’s decision of the regulatory takings case of Lucas v. South Car-
olina Coastal Council203 that a regulatory taking, at least in terms of a categorical 
taking premised on total economic deprivation, cannot be found if the land use ac-
tivity prohibited would not have been allowed under a state’s traditional rules of 
nuisance or property law in the first place (i.e., the uses prohibited were never in-
cluded in the title interest by operation of the state’s common law).204 
This issue, and the proviso included in Lucas, is especially relevant with regard 
to the public trust doctrine. An obvious allegation for a coastal shoreland property 
owner to make, when told that she cannot fully exclude the public from portions of 
her shoreland property or build wherever she wants on that property, is that her 
private property rights have been taken through that regulation, warranting com-
pensation. Yet she may have been prevented from excluding others from the fore-
shore at the edge of her property, or building within that foreshore, by operation of 
the state’s public trust doctrine. If so, and if that doctrine qualifies as a ‘back-
ground principle of state property law,’ then she never had the right to build or 
 200. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
In this case, Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, held that because the Florida state supreme 
court’s ruling regarding the constitutionality of a beach renourishment program was consistent with the 
background principles of property law it did not effect a regulatory taking. However, in a separate part 
of the opinion joined by only a plurality, Justice Scalia argued the proposition that state court decisions 
construing their own state laws could nonetheless be found (presumably by federal court judges) to have 
effected a regulatory taking within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 1029.  
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exclude in her title interest in the first place. By extension, a regulatory takings 
claim would fail (at least as a categorical taking) because nothing was taken. 
This line of reasoning is distressing to strong private property rights advo-
cates. It also animates calls for federal courts to give heightened judicial review 
when a state supreme court makes a ruling on the reach and limits of a given back-
ground principle of state property law, such as the public trust doctrine, presuma-
bly with the hope that the federal courts will declare that the state supreme court 
ruling effected a judicial taking.205 Yet, as discussed at length above, it is hard to 
imagine a state background common law principle of nuisance or property law 
more well-settled than a state’s public trust doctrine as applied to its coastal 
shorelands.206 It is difficult to predict how the U.S. Supreme Court will adjudicate 
future disputes raising claims that call on the Court to recognize a “judicial taking.” 
However, we would note that a federal court ruling that a given state court’s adju-
dication of its own state-specific public trust doctrine nonetheless effected a judi-
cial taking would amount to a breathtaking example of modern judicial activism on 
the part of federal courts, especially given the U.S. Supreme Court’s proviso in 
Lucas.207 
4.  Summary 
In sum, despite assertions from strong private property advocates otherwise, 
the private property doctrine in American law was never meant to safeguard a 
property owner’s ability to make the most profit from his or her land, or to use it 
to the point of harming others, or to compel government to compensate property 
owners for every regulation that might diminish its economic value.208 As noted by 
Justice Holmes in first articulating the regulatory takings doctrine, “[g]overnment 
 205. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. It is hard to imagine, but not out of the question, 
that the U.S. Supreme Court could expand the concept of a judicial taking if a state supreme court were 
to rule, based on its own reading of the state’s traditional background principles, that a regulation did 
not effect a taking, yet the Court were to conclude that the state court was indeed mistaken, that the 
ruling did not comport with traditional background principles despite the state court’s interpretation, 
and that the ruling thus effected a judicial taking. Moreover, it is not clear how the U.S. Supreme 
Court would treat the concept of a judicial taking if in fact a lower federal court were to rule, based on 
its reading of a state’s traditional background principles, that a regulation did not effect a taking, yet the 
Court were to conclude that the lower court was indeed mistaken, that the ruling did not comport with 
traditional background principles, and that the ruling thus effected a judicial taking. In this latter case, 
would the Court then hold the federal government liable for compensation, or would it vacate the rul-
ing and compel the state supreme court to reach such a conclusion, thus making the state liable for com-
pensation? 
 206. See supra Section II.C. 
 207. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Such a ruling would amount to judicial activism 
because it would stray far into the realm of the prerogative a state enjoys to interpret and adjudicate its 
own public trust doctrine, a prerogative recognized by Justice Scalia himself and one safeguarded 
through the Lucas ‘background principles’ proviso. 
 208. See supra Sections II.C.1 & 2.  
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hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be di-
minished without paying for every such change in the general law.”209 Rather, it 
was designed to ensure that duly enabled governmental action is exercised fairly.210 
The American system clearly incorporates a priori reasonable expectations that 
owning private property means something. There exists in the American ethos a 
reasonable expectation that one should be able to possess, reasonably use, and rea-
sonably exclude others from one’s property, and that at least one important func-
tion of American government is to safeguard such expectations. Even so, the 
American government and the law that enlivens it was established to form a “more 
perfect union” first, doing so with appropriate respect for the impacts on individu-
al private property rights as an important but still secondary concern, not vice ver-
sa.211 
Constitutional protections do not absolutely prevent government from taking 
life, liberty, or property, or imposing an economic burden on a property owner for 
the larger good, but those protections do demand that a government be able to jus-
tify that its actions are not wholly unreasonable or patently unfair.212 These protec-
tions allow courts to compel a legislature or executive to stop only when it cannot 
make out such a showing.213 From that perspective, fairness through due process 
protections comes from demanding that government show that it is acting reasona-
bly when it regulates private property, while deferring to the legislature or execu-
tive in its assessment of what that requires except for extraordinary evidence oth-
erwise. Fairness through regulatory takings protections similarly comes from 
demanding that the government not place too heavy a burden on an individual 
property owner, while again deferring to the government in its assessment of what 
that requires except for extraordinary evidence otherwise.214 
Given this review of the police power prerogative, public trust doctrine, and 
private property doctrine separately, the question is how those doctrines interact 
along a coastal shore. 
 209. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 210. See supra Sections II.C.1 & 2. 
 211. It bears repeating that rather than setting out to secure the blessings of private property 
ownership, the drafters of the U.S. Constitution set out to establish a national government that would 
tie together the several states “in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. . . .” U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 212. See supra Sections II.C.1 & 2. 
 213. See GLENDON, supra note 30, at 25-32; see also supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. 
 214. Supra note 213.  
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III.  RECONCILING POLICE POWER PREROGATIVES, PUBLIC TRUST 
INTERESTS, AND PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS  
ALONG COASTAL SHORELANDS 
A.  Police Power and Public Trust Compared and Contrasted 
Both the police power prerogative and the public trust doctrine stem from the 
inherent sovereignty of a state and each traces its historical pedigree back to an-
cient Roman law and English common law.215 Both doctrines, however, are unique-
ly American. These doctrines were first articulated as the ‘police power’ and ‘public 
trust,’ respectively, through American federal and state cases decided very early in 
the country’s history.216 Both exist today as an amalgam of the common, statutory, 
regulatory, and case law of a particular state. Both essentially consolidate the an-
cient powers of the English king and the parliament into the state legislature, ena-
ble the legislature to act on behalf of the indivisible or larger communal interests of 
its people, and protect the interests of private individuals.217 Finally, federal and 
state courts alike have consistently found that both doctrines reflect authorities 
that are so vital and inherent to the well-being of the state and the necessary pre-
rogatives of the legislature that some essential core elements cannot be abrogat-
ed.218 
Beyond those similarities, the full implication of what it means for courts to 
ensure that legislatures not shirk institutional duties has evolved in unique ways 
between the two doctrines. While the courts have long recognized the existence of 
the police power prerogative and asserted repeatedly that it cannot be abrogated, 
courts have not imposed judicially an affirmative duty on the state to exercise that 
power to achieve particular policy goals; largely leaving the decision on where and 
how to exercise the power to the legislative and executive branches instead.219 
Courts’ assessment of whether the state is in danger of having abrogated its police 
power duties have focused on instances when a legislature or executive has pur-
ported to exercise that power, whether it has done so in a way that unduly ceded or 
undermined the public welfare to private interests.220 
In a land use context, particularly with regard to local planning and land use 
regulation, evidence of these judicial concerns is well illustrated by the early judi-
cial doctrines of “contract zoning” and “spot zoning” and the diminished im-
portance of those doctrines over time. Both contract and spot zoning, announced 
 215. See supra Sections II.A.1, II.B.1 & 2. 
 216. See supra Sections II.A.1 & II.B.2. 
 217. See supra Sections II.A & B. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Section II.A. 
 220. See, e.g., debate over the meaning of Illinois Central, supra notes 118, 143-55 and accompany-
ing text.  
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early in the historical adjudication of zoning disputes, represented instances where 
courts concluded that a local government had unlawfully negotiated away its police 
power responsibilities, or unlawfully exercised its zoning authority, to the clear ad-
vantage of the private property owner and clear detriment of the larger public in-
terest.221 Over time, courts have become much less likely to invoke those doctrines, 
especially contract zoning.222 Rather, courts have become more tolerant of negoti-
ated actions such as “conditional rezonings,” recognizing the complex and recipro-
cal needs to be addressed and benefits to be had as the pace and timing of new land 
development imposes extraordinary new costs on local government for infrastruc-
ture and service delivery.223 That is, judicial constitutional doctrine has evolved 
over time as conditions and expectations have changed. 
At the same time, the courts also announced early in the history of zoning that 
local regulation of private property through zoning was such a portentous power 
with regard to private property rights that it necessitated clear and specific delega-
tions of authority by the state—not just reliance on broad delegations of police 
power authorities alone.224 That added level of protection by judicial decree has 
not since changed. As a result, all of the states have granted broad authorities to 
local units of government to engage in planning and zoning actions extensively, 
substantially if not entirely consistent with the powers those local governments 
would have enjoyed through their police power delegations alone but for that earli-
er judicial action.225 
Thus, while local regulation of coastal shorelands particularly through zoning 
must be specifically delegated, including in Great Lakes states like Michigan, such 
delegations have generally been made. Moreover, localities are generally not re-
quired by either legislative action or judicial decree to use police powers (or zoning 
 221. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 59, at 139-41. Consistent with the theme that 
doctrines like these evolve over time in light of changing conditions and expectations, courts are much 
less likely to find instances of spot zoning or contract zoning today as localities work to implement pro-
grams like growth management and struggle to cover the fiscal costs of rapid development. Id. 
 222. See id. at 141-46 (discussing contract and conditional zoning in general). 
 223. See id. at 143; see also FISHER ET AL., supra note 179, at 128-33 (discussing conditional re-
zoning and contract zoning under Michigan law). 
 224. See, e.g., Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 177 N.W. 722 (1920), supra note 64 (striking 
down a Detroit zoning ordinance for not having been duly enabled by the state). 
 225. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 59, at 40-48 (discussing history of zoning and 
sources of authority for it in the U.S.). The universal adoption of zoning and then planning enabling 
laws was facilitated greatly by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that local zoning regulations were not, 
on their face, violative of constitutional protections of private property rights in Euclid, and by the U.S. 
Bureau of Commerce’s publication of model enabling laws, the State Standard Zoning Enabling Act in 
1926 and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act in 1928. See id. at 42-45. It is worth noting that this 
decision and these publications were not responding to state judicial decrees regarding zoning authori-
ties alone. Rather, they were also arguably a result of entrenched racial discrimination playing itself out 
through state and local land use regulation. See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 75, at 39-57.  
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authorities) to address areas like coastal shorelands for whatever purpose.226 When 
localities do, however, the courts generally approach those actions deferentially, 
asking not whether the state or locality’s authorities overextended but whether 
those authorities were exercised unfairly.227 
In contrast, referring to common law and constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, courts have imposed a duty on state governments through the public trust 
doctrine to ensure that the public interest is secured in its seas and shorelands, in-
cluding the inland seas and shorelands of the Great Lakes.228 This is not a duty to 
hold fee title interests in all submerged lands and shorelands into perpetuity, but 
rather a duty to ensure that public trust interests in common access and use are 
safeguarded, regardless of the title ownership of the underlying property. 
The notion of a public interest in coastal shorelands, and a corresponding ir-
revocable duty on the part of the state229 to safeguard that public trust interest, 
comes from an array of sources and justifications. As detailed above, while it is of-
ten traced to principles of ancient Roman law and English common law, that his-
torical pedigree serves more to highlight the fact that coastal resources have always 
been viewed as unique and distinctly special compared to upland property, rather 
than to establish unassailable legal precedent.230 In the American context, there has 
been the recognition of the indivisibility of the shorelands commons and the re-
sources provided to—and in a sense the communal interests owned by—the unor-
ganized public.231 
In a more theoretical way, the public trust duty is based on longstanding cus-
tom and expectations, along with a general sense of the need for fairness in the al-
location of public and private interests at the shore. In a more practical way, it 
serves to prevent the legislature from undermining its duty to represent and regu-
late on behalf of the general public by doing things like improvidently selling off 
submerged lands and coastal shorelands for short-term economic gain.232 To that 
extent, and given the special status of coastal shorelands historically, the existence 
of some affirmative duty imposed upon the state to safeguard its public trust inter-
ests, in contrast to the lack of such an affirmative duty to exercise the police power, 
makes sense. 
Finally, all of the states have uniformly delegated the authority to regulate 
privately owned lands—including privately owned coastal shorelands—to their lo-
 226. See Appendix A. 
 227. See supra Section II.C.2. 
 228. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 2005). 
 229. Specifically, state legislatures enjoying the consolidated powers of parliament and the king 
and acting as the sovereign on behalf of the people. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 
U.S. 518, 559–60, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819). 
 230. See supra Section II.B. 
 231. See Rose, supra note 106. 
 232. Supra note 118 and accompanying text.  
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cal units of government,233 and those authorities are remarkably similar across the 
states for historical reasons.234 Coastal states, however, have not similarly delegated 
either the duty to protect jus publicum interests in coastal shorelands through land 
use regulation or other means, or the authority to do so, to their local units of gov-
ernment under the public trust doctrine.235 At least, such delegations appear to be 
much narrower and perhaps based as much or more on police power prerogatives as 
on public trust doctrines.236 
B.  Police Power and Public Trust Checked and Critiqued 
Checking the potential abuse of governmental actions when managing its pub-
lic trust waters and lands, the private property doctrine serves to ensure that when 
a state invokes its public trust doctrine to protect common access to coastal 
shorelands, or its police power authority to prevent the loss of vital habitat, it does 
so in a way that is, at least arguably, reasonable and fair.237 Under American law 
given the separation of powers doctrine, courts do not impose judicial preferences 
in deciding what policy or regulation would be the most reasonable or effective, or 
what would be the best way to balance fairness as between a property owner and 
the community; courts only act to check a governmental action when it is clear that 
those regulations are wholly unreasonable or unfair.238 Thus, when governments 
have good evidence that regulations or policies are legitimate and reasonably relat-
ed to the problems governments are trying to solve or forestall, and that those pol-
icies comport with long-established and reasonable expectations on how to balance 
private and public interests at the coastal shore, those actions will generally be up-
held by the courts.239 
Contemporary critics of the public trust doctrine go to great lengths first to 
attack the historical pedigree and internal logic and coherence of that doctrine, es-
pecially when setting out to defend an absolutist version of private property rights 
 233. See supra Section II.A. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See SLADE ET AL., supra note 86, at 235-36. 
 236. The State of Michigan’s High Risk Erosion program, for example, does allow local units of 
government to adopt local regulations that effectively implement the state program. Unlike zoning au-
thorities and police power delegations more generally in most states, however, these provisions are more 
prescriptive, and the zoning ordinances adopted must be approved by the state. MICH. ADMIN. CODE 
r. 281.21-281.26 (2018). In contrast, the State of North Carolina, as another example, authorizes local 
zoning and it mandates coastal area planning by its Atlantic coastal counties under its Coastal Area 
Management Act (CAMA), but those authorizations and mandates are grounded in police power pre-
rogatives and federal Coastal Zone Management Program provisions rather than the State of North 
Carolina’s public trust doctrine. For a history of CAMA, see David W. Owens, Coastal Management in 
North Carolina: Building a Regional Consensus, 51 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 322 (1985). 
 237. See supra Section II.C. 
 238. See supra Section II.C. 
 239. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 59, at 43.  
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that would deny any public interest in the shore (i.e., except for any foreshore that 
is already in public ownership in fee).240 Critics do so, however, without extending 
the same critical analysis of historical pedigree and internal logic and coherence to 
American notions of private property rights.241 Moreover, these critics tend to 
adopt a particular historical version of private property rights’ origins and its 
meaning that is far from universally accepted or uncontestable.242 To that extent, 
the analyses are incomplete, and the conclusions warrant tempering. 
Similarly, commentators critical of the police power and especially the public 
trust doctrine also often assert the need to ensure that a regulation of privately-
owned land is ‘constitutional,’243 not whether it comports with police power or 
public trust imperatives. That assertion, however, suggests that the constitution in 
its entirety was adopted to make sure only that the courts act to secure individual 
interests in private property first, and then to enable legislative and administrative 
government for the benefit of the larger society second, and presumably only 
through the aggregation of individual benefits.244 These critics especially take this 
stand to argue that judicial action to effect the public trust doctrine represents ju-
dicial activism, outside the boundaries of the American scheme.245 In doing so, 
however, these critics subtly argue that only aggressive judicial review (if not ‘ac-
tivism’) that safeguards private property rights in the form of constitutional adju-
dication is acceptable, while parallel aggressive review to ensure safeguards of pub-
lic welfare and interests is not. That proposition, again, is certainly neither 
universal nor uncontestable. 
Finally, MacGrady, Deveney, and others provide extensive reviews of ancient 
Roman law and English common law to argue that later English and American 
common law courts, as well as contemporary commenters, have misconstrued what 
ancient Romans and Anglo-Saxon Normans actually thought of their coastal shore-
lines, and that indeed neither the ancient Romans nor the medieval English recog-
nized anything but the rule of capture (or attempts of expropriation by the king) at 
the shore.246 In addition to being contestable in terms of historical scholarship, 
what those analyses ultimately and better show is that the law has continually 
struggled to reconcile the interests of the community with the interests of private 
property owners at the coastal shore, a struggle that has extended from the earliest 
recordings from ancient Greece all the way through today. 
In sum, to assert that the public trust doctrine is not a valid American com-
mon law because the ancient Greeks and Romans would not have universally rec-
 240. See supra Sections II.B & C. 
 241. See supra Sections II.B & C. 
 242. See supra Sections II.B & C. 
 243. See, e.g., MacGrady, supra note 95, at 587; Deveney, supra note 95; Huffman, supra note 89. 
 244. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 71; SIEGAN, supra note 85, at 13. 
 245. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 89; Paganelli, supra note 89. 
 246. See supra Section II.A.  
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ognized it as such raises the questions of how far back one must go, and how much 
clear consensus one must demonstrate, to assert that there is a coherent doctrine 
that ought to be respected. The common law helps establish reasonable expecta-
tions on what the law is and what it will likely be tomorrow. At the same time, the 
ability of the courts to overrule precedent when there are compelling reasons to do 
so has simultaneously allowed the common law to evolve over time in light of the 
evolving needs and expectations of society, much like legislators can amend stat-
utes in response to changing conditions or constituent demands. There is some-
thing disingenuous in the arguments of strong private property advocates demand-
ing that “ancient” common law should be jealously safeguarded by the courts when 
it speaks to notions of private property rights, but that “ancient” common law simi-
larly formed should not be safeguarded when it speaks to notions of public trust 
interests in the seas and their shores. 
C.  Institutional Roles and Doctrinal Prognosis 
In defining the appropriate roles of courts and legislatures, it is important to 
remember that neither the police power prerogative nor the public trust doctrine 
put public policy decision-making entirely into the courts’ hands. Rather, like the 
private property doctrine, which compels the courts to take a hard look when legis-
lation or regulations might be unduly abusing the rights of private property owner-
ship, the public trust doctrine requires courts to take a hard look when legislative 
or regulatory actions may be undermining the public trust’s long-established inter-
ests in communal access to coastal shorelands.247 
In the end, whether based on strictly complete or correct interpretations of 
ancient Greek and Roman law, or the ancient common law of England stemming 
from the treatises of Bracton, Hale, and other jurists from the twelfth through six-
teenth centuries, both federal and state courts recognized early on a robust public 
trust doctrine in coastal settings that has extended through today.248 While the 
particulars of the doctrine as applied by evolving judicial doctrine have and will 
likely continue to evolve over time for a given state, it is hard to see any coastal 
state completely jettisoning the doctrine altogether—at least not based on the rea-
soning that the historical and logical justifications of that doctrine are unsound 
given the pedigree of that history. It would seem more likely that any judicial 
modification of the doctrine will be at its edges and will emanate from the particu-
lars of the coastal dynamics and doctrinal history that are apt for the specific dis-
pute at hand. 
 247. See supra Sections II.B & C. 
 248. MacGrady’s critique of the concept of navigability as derived from ancient Roman law 
acknowledges nonetheless that by the late 1800s “the prima facie rule [i.e., the public trust doctrine] had 
already become settled doctrine in England, and, in America, state ownership of the foreshore had been 
established beyond question by the U.S.  Supreme Court’s 1842 decision in Martin v. Waddell.” Mac-
Grady supra note 95, at 552 (footnotes and citations omitted).  
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IV.  THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES OF THE GREAT LAKES STATES 
A.  Overview 
As is typical among ocean coastal states that have adopted the public trust 
doctrine, the Great Lakes states vary in their adoption and adaptation of its princi-
ple features.249 While all eight states observe the convention that the lakebed is 
held by the state in trust for the people of that state, the states diverge especially in 
the identification of lakeward and landward boundaries, as well as on the questions 
of whether those boundaries are coterminous or overlapping and what that means 
in terms of balancing public and private interests. We describe here, and summa-
rize in Table 1 below, selected key elements of the public trust doctrines of the 
Great Lakes states today. More detailed explication of those doctrines is provided 
in Appendix A. It is important to note that, for several of the states, these key at-
tributes are based on old cases that address questions not quite on point in terms of 
modern framing, making definitive statements on current law in those states im-
prudent. 
In terms of boundaries, Minnesota and Pennsylvania observe the lakeward 
boundary of the jus privatum to be the low water mark,250 while Michigan and Ohio 
observe it to be essentially at the water’s edge or natural shoreline251 and Illinois 
appears to place it at the water’s edge as well.252 Indiana is the only Great Lakes 
state to clearly establish the high water mark (or ordinary high water mark) as the 
lakeward boundary of the jus privatum;253 New York and Wisconsin appear to do so 
by case law as well, but those cases are not precise on that question.254 In addition, 
the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources has published guidance indicating 
that it interprets the state’s public trust doctrine such that riparian owners have 
 249. The Great Lakes states have generally relied on the same recitations of ancient Roman law, 
English common law, and American federal and state common law discussed above, supra Section 
11.B.1, as the sources of authority for their particular public trust doctrines. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 
703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005). In addition, the Great Lakes that joined the union after its founding 
(i.e., all but New York and Pennsylvania) enjoy additional authority historically through the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787. See MODERN WATER LAW, supra note 86, at 343-44. 
 250. State ex rel. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Minn. 1971); Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 
210, 221 (1869). 
 251. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 69; State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 725 
(Ohio 1948). 
 252. Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, 525 (1860). 
 253. Gunderson v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1187 (Ind. 2018). Gunderson filed with the U.S. Su-
preme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Indiana on October 5, 2018; see 
also IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-26-2 (West 1998). 
 254. See People ex rel. Burnham v. Jones, 112 N.Y. 597, 605 (1889); see Diana Shooting Club v. 
Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914).  
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exclusive control over shorelands below the ordinary high water mark (i.e., even if 
case law suggests that the jus privatum ends at that mark).255 
From the other direction, the landward boundary of the jus publicum appears 
to be similarly varied among the states, although in practical application most are 
substantially the same. Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania appear to observe 
the landward boundary of the jus publicum to be the high water mark,256 New York 
appears to situate it at the mean high water mark,257 Indiana and Michigan both 
clearly place it at the ordinary high water mark,258 and Illinois appears to place it at 
the ordinary high water mark.259 In other words, despite variation in the use of 
specific terms and marks, all seven of these states place the landward reach of the 
public interest at some point up the shore touched by high water. Only Ohio uses 
the water’s edge as the boundary.260 
All of the states using high water or ordinary high water as a boundary for the 
jus publicum appear to employ a natural ordinary high water mark, defined in one 
way or another as the point along the shore showing evidence of the presence of 
water in the past sufficient to scour away long-lived vegetation.261 Both Michigan 
and Indiana have adopted elevation-based standards as well (i.e., defined as the 
point along the shore corresponding to a specified elevation above sea level), but 
both limit the applicability of that standard to use by administrative agencies for 
establishing the reach of regulatory authority, not for marking the reach of tradi-
tional public uses like navigation, traversing, or fishing by the general public.262 
Equally important to establishing boundaries per se is clarifying the relation-
ships and interaction between the jus privatum and jus publicum interests given 
those boundaries. Based on the analysis noted above, Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, 
and New York appear to avoid overlapping private and public rights by selecting a 
single boundary line, with Ohio placing it essentially at the standing water’s edge 
and the rest at a high water mark. Ohio state caselaw thus suggests that the public 
has no public trust right to access the beach above the water’s edge on Ohio’s Lake 
 255. See WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., PUBL-WZ004 08REV, ORDINARY HIGH WATER. 
 256. State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 623 (Minn. 1914); Diana Shooting Club, 145 N.W. at 820; 
Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210, 221 (1869). 
 257. Burnham, 112 N.Y. at 606. 
 258. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-26-2 (West 1998); Gunderson, 90 N.E.3d at 1173; Glass v. Goeckel, 
703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005). 
 259. 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24 (2004); Cobb v. Comm’rs of Lincoln Park, 67 N.E. 5, 6 (Ill. 
1903). 
 260. State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 725 (Ohio 1948); State ex rel. Mer-
rill v. Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res., 130 Ohio St. 3d 30, 35 (2011). More precisely, Merrill set the boundary 
of the jus publicum on Lake Erie at the line at which the water usually stands when free from disturbing 
causes, although the court did not provide any additional guidance on what that standard means or how 
it might be discerned in application on the shore. Id. at 40. 
 261. See, e.g., Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 73. 
 262. See, e.g., Burleson v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 292 Mich. App. 544, 547-52 (2011).  
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Erie shoreline. In contrast, the Indiana Supreme Court recently held that the sin-
gle boundary separating public from private ownership is at the natural ordinary 
high water mark, and that the state owns its Great Lakes public trust beaches in 
fee—making its public trust doctrine the most expansive doctrine of the Great 
Lakes states in terms of public ownership.263 
In contrast, Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan and Pennsylvania appear to have 
overlapping rights, observing the rights of a riparian owner to low water or the wa-
ter’s edge but enforcing the jus publicum to the ordinary high water mark. For ex-
ample, Michigan case law expressly states that even if a private owner’s title ex-
tends into the water, the public’s rights of navigation on the Great Lakes include 
the right to walk on the lakeside of the ordinary high-water mark.264 For Minneso-
ta, in comparison, the relationship is not so clear. Riparian owners hold title to the 
low water mark; however, that title is absolute only to the high water mark.265 
Even so, owners may deny access to and from the water adjacent to their property 
interest, and have the right to wharf out to the point of navigability.266 At the same 
time, owners take title to the land subject to an easement to the state to fulfill its 
duty to protect public use (e.g., for commercial navigation and recreational activi-
ty).267 
Finally, note again that Wisconsin state case law indicates that the jus publicum 
reaches landward to the ordinary high water mark and that the jus privatum and 
jus publicum boundaries do not overlap, suggesting that at the very least the public 
should have access to exposed shorelands below the ordinary high water mark.268 
The Wisconsin DNR, however, appears to interpret the Wisconsin public trust 
doctrine to give exclusive control of exposed shoreland below the ordinary high 
water mark to the riparian owner (i.e., no public access allowed on privately owned 
shoreland, as in Ohio).269 
Regarding the ability of a state to alienate public trust shoreland, all of the 
Great Lakes states’ public trust doctrines provide for the filling or construction in-
to navigable waters by permit,270 consistent with Deveney’s argument that the 
Romans tolerated private ownership of submerged lands and foreshores.271 Even 
 263. Gunderson v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1171 (Ind. 2018). The plaintiff in this case recently filed a 
petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which is under review at the time of this writing. 
See supra note 253. 
 264. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Mich. 2005). 
 265. State ex rel. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Minn. 1971). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See supra notes 254 & 256. 
 269. See WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES., supra note 255. 
 270. See, e.g., 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.32502 
(West 2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (LexisNexis 2001); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
261 Wis. 492 (1952); Movrich v. Lobermeier, 372 Wis. 2d 734, 734-35 (2016). 
 271. See supra Section II.B.4.  
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so, all appear to qualify the conditions under which that may be done. For exam-
ple, permits may be subject to demonstration by the proponent that the actions 
“will not substantially affect public use of the lands for hunting, fishing, swim-
ming, pleasure boating, or navigation or that the public trust in the state will not 
be impaired by those agreements for use, sales, lease, or other disposition.”272 This 
allowance may include the opportunity to acquire title by filling. Alternatively, in 
Indiana a riparian owner may not fill in real property or construct a dock or wharf 
beyond the dock or harbor line, defined by the United States.273 However, a ripari-
an landowner may acquire title to submerged land between the shore and dock or 
harbor line, and thereafter fill and patent that land, under state permit.274 In Mich-
igan, state statute allows for the sale, lease, or other disposition of unpatented bot-
tomlands, including filling submerged lands, but in all instances the proponent 
must demonstrate that these actions “will not substantially affect public use of the 
lands for hunting, fishing, swimming, pleasure boating, or navigation or that the 
public trust in the state will not be impaired by those agreements for use, sales, 
lease, or other disposition.”275 
Finally, beyond the questions of ownership interests and public access, Wis-
consin appears to be the most ambitious of the eight Great Lakes states in terms of 
establishing a state duty to protect public trust shorelands. It has an expansively 
defined duty to preserve public trust lands and waters, not limited to its duty to 
ensure navigability; to protect natural resources and the environment; and to pre-
serve scenic beauty.276 Case law has further held the state’s public trust duties to 
include eradication and prevention of pollution.277 
TABLE 1. SELECTED ATTRIBUTES OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES OF 



























Yes Yes Yes LWM HWM Yes 
WI 1914 
(case) 
Yes Yes Yes HWM HWM No 
IL 1860 
(case) 
Yes Yes Yes Water’s 
edge 
OHWM Yes 
 272. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.32502 (West 2018). 
 273. IND. CODE ANN. § 14-18-6-3 (West 1998). 
 274. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-18-6-4 to -6 (West 1998). 
 275. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.32502 (West 2018). 
 276. Just v. Marinette Cty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972); see Muench v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492 (1952). 
 277. See Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 271 N.W.2d 69, 72-73 (Wis. 
1978).  
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OHWM = ordinary high water mark; HWM = high water mark; LWM = low wa-
ter mark. 
* A Pennsylvania court has held that the Commonwealth does not lose title to 
filled land (Delaware Ave., LLC v. Dept. of Cons., 997 A.2d 1231 (2010)). 
B.  Conclusions and Questions Remaining 
This Article has examined the historical pedigree, logic, and evolution of each 
of three common law doctrines as they have come together and interacted along 
the shores of the Laurentian Great Lakes—the police power, public trust, and pri-
vate property rights doctrines. A principal motivation for this work is that propo-
nents of the public trust doctrine in particular often cite back to ancient Roman 
and English common law as its source. Detractors, in turn, increasingly question 
the historical pedigree and logic of that doctrine more generally and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the applicability of it to Great Lakes shores. Few of those same detractors, 
however, similarly question the pedigree, logic, or evolution of either the police 
power or private property rights doctrines. Review of all three separately in terms 
of each doctrine’s origins and evolution, and juxtaposition in terms of interactions 
with and implications for the others, provides some insights into the challenges of 
discerning the original understandings and the evolving application of common law 
doctrines in real-world settings generally, as well as the difficulties that courts and 
legislatures have encountered in reconciling those doctrines along Great Lakes 
shorelines more particularly. 
In broad terms, review of the judicial and scholarly treatment of each of these 
doctrines underscores our initial observation that contemporary conclusions about 
the original meanings and historical pedigree of a common law doctrine—
especially doctrinaire statements—should be asserted with some care. Hard and 
fast assertions run the risk of being over-simplified, taken out of context, or other-
wise misconstrued. Our review also underscores the risk of selectively critiquing a 
doctrine that can only be understood fully in the context of competing doctrines 
without similarly critiquing those other doctrines as well; that is, for risk of raising 
purportedly fatal flaws of the one doctrine that could equally be leveled at the oth-
ers. 
Critics of the public trust doctrine as it has been applied in the American con-
text have ably demonstrated that strong assertions about the meaning of that doc- 
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trine based specifically on its historical pedigree and logic—that it places title own-
ership of submerged lands and foreshores in the state and that that ownership is 
inalienable—clearly go too far.278 At the same time, that same scholarship also 
clearly demonstrates that there has always been something special about the shore, 
that the waters, submerged lands, and foreshores of the oceans and inland seas are 
commons resources that always have been available for some limited public use, 
even if some underlying title interests of those resources are privatized.279 Similar-
ly, selective critique of the public trust doctrine alone, especially on historical 
grounds, without consideration of the historical origins of police power authorities 
or private property rights in parallel, leads to conclusions that undermine the 
soundness of the latter—especially private property rights—upon fuller analysis.280 
That is, while reference to public interests along coastal shorelines clearly do exist 
back to sixth century Roman times, notions of private property interests—at least 
as understood in the American context today— are indeed more recent, reaching 
back primarily to the seventeenth  century writings of John Locke.281 
Careful review suggests that all three doctrines trace their roots to English 
common law and even ancient Roman law, but are all in fact distinctly American 
doctrines, first fully articulated and then developed over time in the context of 
unique American institutions, values, and conflicts. Each is equally robust, and 
each is as aptly applied to American coasts as the other. Conversely, if indeed the 
public trust doctrine is susceptible to critique for its historical pedigree, then doc-
trinal notions of the police power and private property rights as juxtaposed to it are 
equally so. Moreover, despite case law and commentary rhetoric that can be dog-
matically extreme, efforts to understand and reconcile these doctrines in practice 
generally strike a pragmatic balance, recognizing simultaneously the private rights 
inherent in shoreland property ownership along with the public interest in com-
mon access to and use of submerged lands and the foreshore, within reason. 
In addition, careful review demonstrates that the public trust doctrine has 
been long applied by all of the Great Lakes states to their Great Lakes shorelands 
through common law doctrine, and all but one (Pennsylvania) have codified at 
least portions of that doctrine through statute, for at least a century if not long-
er.282 Application of that doctrine makes sense because, while the lakes are not tidal 
as are the oceans, the standing water levels of the lakes fluctuate substantially over 
time nonetheless.283 Because of those fluctuations, there are periods of low water 
and especially periods of high water along those shores, such that some portion of 
 278. Supra Section II.B. 
 279. Supra Section II.B. 
 280. Supra Sections II.B & C. 
 281. Supra Section II.C. 
 282. See supra Section IV.A. 
 283. See Norton et al., supra note 19, for more detailed explication of Great Lakes shoreline dy-
namics and application of the concept of an ‘ordinary high water mark’ in that context.  
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Great Lakes shoreland is regularly scoured by the forces of water in a way that 
makes use of it for cultivation or building imprudent—a sometimes inconvenient 
brute fact of Nature that cannot be simply dismissed through application of legal 
fiction. Even so, because periods between low and high water can be drawn out 
across decades, application of the doctrine to the Great Lakes has proven to be less 
than straightforward. This has been especially complicated in terms of discerning 
where and what an ordinary high water mark means on a Great Lakes shore and 
what the relationship between public trust interests and private property rights 
should be lakeward of it. That fact of Nature has also led to some variation in doc-
trinal application across the states. 
As detailed above, all eight Great Lakes states assert fee title ownership of 
their submerged Great Lakes bottomlands.284 All recognize expressly or impliedly 
the concept of a ‘moveable freehold’ (whether using that term or some other), such 
that transitions of public to private shoreland or vice-versa occur through the natu-
ral dynamics of Great Lakes coastal processes.285 All similarly recognize a public 
trust interest in their submerged lands, while all but one (Ohio) appear to recog-
nize if not expressly declare that that public trust interest extends landward up on-
to the foreshore to some mark of high water, and indeed that fee title ownership 
may extend that far as well (as recently held by the Supreme Court of Indiana).286 
All recognize that the scope of those public trust interests includes traditional uses 
such as navigation and fishing,287 although the precise contours of those uses ap-
pear to vary across the states, or have at least not been fully circumscribed. Finally, 
all also allow for the alienation of public trust submerged lands and foreshore into 
private ownership, but all appear to continue to impress a duty to safeguard public 
trust interests on that transaction itself, if not one that survives after.288 
Given all those similarities, there are still uncertainties that warrant further 
analysis. These uncertainties include a number of questions left unresolved by law, 
such as what use rights exactly are retained under the public trust doctrine and to 
what extent private shoreland owners might act to ameliorate conflicts. Similarly, 
what ability does local government have to exercise public trust duties to protect 
public trust interests or reconcile public and private conflicts? Or, what exactly is 
the relationship between legislative and judicial authorities in amending a state’s 
public trust doctrine over time? There are also a number of questions that arise 
from the interaction between law and Nature—especially relevant in Great Lakes 
coastal settings. Most compellingly, what public trust duties and private property 
rights are implicated as shorelands change artificially because of the construction of 
shoreline armoring or other structures? Similarly, do traditional notions of accre-
 284. See SLADE ET AL., supra note 86; supra Section IV.A. 
 285. Supra Section IV.A. 
 286. Supra Section IV.A. 
 287. Supra Section IV.A. 
 288. Supra Section IV.A.  
 
NORTON_MEA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2019  3:21 PM 
Spring 2019] Reconciling Police Power 469 
tion, reliction, erosion, and avulsion continue to be viable on a Great Lakes shore? 
And, what is the potential for a state and/or local government to be held liable 
when it permits imprudent shoreland development, given increased knowledge of 
how imprudent such development can be? All of these questions are best addressed 
in the context of a single state’s particular doctrine, and all represent questions for 
further study. 
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APPENDIX A: OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES OF THE 
GREAT LAKES STATES 
State Summary of Law 
Illinois In Illinois, title to the bed of Lake Michigan is held in trust for the people of that 
State. 615 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24 (2004). The boundary line of land adjoining Lake 
Michigan is defined as “the line at which the water usually stands when free from 
disturbing causes.” Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, 525 (1860). However, the Illinois 
Supreme Court has also held that: 
In England . . . it has been treated as settled that the title in the soil of the sea 
or arms of the sea, below ordinary high-water mark, is in the sovereign, ex-
cept so far as an individual or a corporation has acquired rights in it by ex-
press grant or by prescription or usage, and that this title, jus privatum, 
whether in the sovereign or in the subject, is held subject to the public right, 
jus publicum, of navigation and fishing . . . . This is the doctrine of this State 
as applied to lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan . . . . 
Cobb v. Comm’rs of Lincoln Park, 67 N.E. 5 (Ill. 1903) (citations omitted). These 
cases suggest that private title extends to the water and that public trust interests in 
navigation and fishing extend to the ordinary high water mark such that they can 
overlap, but this question appears to not have been litigated directly on point. 
Under the common law doctrine of public trust, a riparian landowner may gain title 
to land added by “gradual and imperceptible” accretion. See, e.g., Schulte v. War-
ren, 75 N.E. 783, 784-85 (Ill. 1905). Similarly, if the water were to gradually and 
imperceptibly encroach upon riparian land, the owner would lose title to that land. 
Id. However, “where there is a sudden or marked change in the shore line and the 
lands of the adjoining owner are flooded or the course of a stream changed, the 
adjoining owner is not thereby divested of his title.” Id. While the general rule is 
that a landowner may not gain title to naturally accreted land by virtue of artificial 
structures, if he receives that benefit from actions undertaken by others, he gains 
title. Brundage v. Knox, 117 N.E. 123 (Ill. 1917). 
It is unlawful to erect any structure or fill, deposit any matter, or build wharves or 
piers in the navigable waters of Lake Michigan without acquiring a State permit. 
615 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/18 (2004). In Du Pont v. Miller, 141 N.E. 423 (1923), the 
Court announced that, “It is made the duty of the state to secure the public ease-
ments against encroachment. . . .” Id. at 427. 
Navigable waters in Illinois are defined as “any public waters which are or can be 
made usable for water commerce.” 70 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1810/2 (West 2005). In navi-
gable waters, including Lake Michigan, private riparian ownership is subject to 
public easement of navigation. Du Pont v. Miller, 141 N.E. 423 (1923). 
Key Statutes 
• Submerged Lands Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 605/ (2004). 
• Illinois Port District Act, 70 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1810/ (2005). 
• Rivers, Lakes, and Streams Act, 615 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/ (2004). 
Key Cases 
• Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521 (1860). 
• Revell v. People, 52 N.E. 1052 (Ill. 1898). 
• Cobb v. Comm’rs of Lincoln Park, 67 N.E. 5 (Ill. 1903). 
• Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783 (Ill. 1905). 
• Brundage v. Knox, 117 N.E. 123 (Ill. 1917). 
• State v. New, 117 N.E. 597 (Ill. 1917). 
• Du Pont v. Miller, 310 Ill. 140, 141 N.E. 423 (1923). 
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• Beacham v. Lake Zurich Prop. Owners Ass’n, 526 N.E.2d 154 (Ill. 
1988). 
 
Indiana The State of Indiana holds title to the bed of Lake Michigan in trust for the public. 
Lake Sand Co. v. State ex rel. Att’y Gen., 120 N.E. 714, 715 (Ind. App. 1918). A 
riparian owner may not fill in real property or construct a dock or wharf beyond the 
dock or harbor line, defined by the United States. Ind. Code Ann. § 14-18-6-3 
(West 1998). However, a riparian landowner may acquire title to submerged land 
between the shore and dock or harbor line, and thereafter fill and patent that land, 
under state permit. Ind. Code Ann. § 14-18-6-4 (West 1998). 
Rights to the shore of Lake Michigan are controlled by the common law public 
trust doctrine, under which the state holds title to the beds of navigable lakes and 
streams below the natural high-water mark for the use and benefit of the whole 
people. Ind. Code Ann. § 14-26-2 (West 1998). The Indiana Supreme Court, re-
versing in part a Court of Appeals decision, recently held that: 
the boundary separating public trust land from privately-owned riparian land 
along the shores of Lake Michigan is the common-law ordinary high water 
mark and that, absent an authorized legislative conveyance, the State retains 
exclusive title up to that boundary. We therefore . . . reverse the [Court of 
Appeal’s] decision that private property interests here overlap with those of 
the State. 
Gunderson v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1173 (Ind. Sup Ct. 2018). The Court further 
held that the common-law “natural OHWM is the legal boundary separating State-
owned public trust land from privately-owned riparian land” rather than the eleva-
tion-based administrative ordinary high water mark. Id. at 1187 (footnotes omitted). 
As is typical under the public interest doctrine, riparian owners in Indiana possess 
the right to accretion due to natural causes. Ind. Code Ann. § 14-26-2 (West 1998). 
Riparian owners may apply for state permit to alter the shoreline or bed of a public 
lake. Id. 
Key Statutes 
• Ind. Code Ann. § 14-26-2 (West 1998). 
• Ind. Code Ann. § 14-29-1-1 (West 1998). 
• Ind. Code Ann. § 14-18-6 (West 1998). 
Key Cases 
• Lake Sand Co. v. State ex rel. Att’y Gen., 120 N.E. 714 (Ind. App. 
1918). 
• State ex rel. Ind. Dep’t of Conservation v. Kivett, 95 N.E.2d 145 (Ind. 
1950). 
• Bath v. Courts, 459 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). 
• Gunderson v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1171 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 2018). 
 
Michigan In Michigan, the Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act governs ownership of the 
Great Lakes’ submerged lands. The Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act, Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 324.32501-.32516 (West Supp. 2006). The State’s public 
trust doctrine is defined as “the perpetual duty of the [S]tate to secure to its people 
the prevention of pollution, impairment or destruction of its natural resources, and 
the rights of navigation, fishing, hunting and use of its lands and waters for other 
public purposes.” Mich. Admin. Code r. 322.1001(m) (1999). 
GLSLA covers all unpatented bottomlands and made lands in the Great Lakes that 
belong to the State or are held in trust by the State. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 324.32502. It does not cover lands patented to a shoreland owner by the U.S. 
Government prior to when Michigan became a state, where the patent demonstrat-
ed a clear intent that the lakeward boundary of the property was fixed and not sub-
ject to natural movement. Klais v. Danowski, 129 N.W.2d 414 (1964). For lands 
not thus patented, the GLSLA allows for the sale, lease, or other disposition of the  
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unpatented bottomlands, including filling submerged lands. Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. §§ 324.32502. However, in all instances, the proponent must demonstrate 
that these actions “will not substantially affect public use of the lands for hunting, 
fishing, swimming, pleasure boating, or navigation or that the public trust in the 
state will not be impaired by those agreements for use, sales, lease, or other disposi-
tion.” Id. If a riparian owner wishes to dredge or place any materials on the bed of 
the Great Lakes, she must obtain a State permit. Id. GLSLA does not affect prop-
erty rights secured by a swamp land grant or acquired by naturally occurring accre-
tions. Id. 
Michigan case law states that even if a private owner’s title extends into the water, 
the public’s rights of navigation on the Great Lakes include the right to walk on the 
lakeside of the ordinary high-water mark. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 
2005). In this case, the Michigan Supreme Court set aside GLSLA’s administrative 
ordinary high water mark for purposes other than regulatory administration, defin-
ing the ordinary high water mark as “the point on the bank or shore up to which the 
presence and action of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark either 
by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily recognized charac-
teristic.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 324.32502; Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 
58,72 (Mich. 2005). A few years later, the Court of Appeals further bifurcated 
Glass’s dual limits (GLSLA’s elevation-based administrative high water mark and 
the “natural” ordinary high water mark as defined in Glass). Burleson v. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Quality, 292 Mich. App. 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011). Under Burleson, the 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality may only regulate to the adminis-
trative boundary. Id. at 554. 
Key Statutes 
• The Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§  324.32501-32516 (West Supp. 2006). 
Key Cases 
• Lincoln v. Davis, 19 N.W. 103 (Mich. 1884). 
• People v. Silberwood, 67 N.W. 1087 (Mich. 1896). 
• Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51 (Mich. 1926). 
• Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159 (Mich. 1930). 
• Klais v. Danowski, 129 N.W.2d 414 (Mich. 1964). 
• Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005). 
• Burleson v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 292 Mich. App. 544 (2011). 
 
Minnesota Minnesota caselaw applying the public trust doctrine is relatively sparse. Save 
Mille Lacs Sportsfishing, Inc. 859 N.W. 2d 845, 851 (2015). The State holds in 
public trust the title to the subsurface soils up to the low-water mark of all naviga-
ble lakes, including Lake Superior. State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 621 (Minn. 
1914). This title imposes upon the State a duty to maintain those waters for naviga-
tion and other public use. State v. Longyear Holding Co., 224 Minn. 451, 472–73 
(1947). 
Riparian owners hold the title to the low-water mark; however, their title is abso-
lute only to the high-water mark. State ex rel. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 
532 (Minn. 1971). They may deny access to and from the water adjacent to their 
property interest, and they have the right to wharf out to the point of navigability. 
Id. 
As in other Great Lake states, the area between low-water mark and the high-water 
mark is subject to both the jus publicum and the jus privatum. State v. Korrer, 148 
N.W. 617, 621 (Minn. 1914). Riparian owners take title to the land subject to an 
easement to the State to fulfill their duty to protect public use (e.g., for commercial 
navigation and recreational activity). State ex rel. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 
530, 532 (Minn. 1971). However, where a riparian owner had filled and reclaimed 
land, the Court ruled that the State had to pay just compensation for the land when  
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it wished to build a highway. State ex rel. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530 
(Minn. 1971). 
The State defines the ordinary high-water mark of lakes by statute as “an elevation 
delineating the highest water level that has been maintained for a sufficient period 
of time to leave evidence upon the landscape, commonly the point where the natu-
ral vegetation changes from predominantly aquatic to predominantly terrestrial.” 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 103G.005, Subd. 14 (West 2005). 
Key Statutes 
• Minn. Stat. Ann. § 103G.005, Subd. 14 (West 2005). 
Key Cases 
• State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617 (Minn. 1914). 
• State v. Longyear Holding Co., 224 Minn. 451 (1947). 
• State ex rel. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. 1971). 
• Save Mille Lacs Sportsfishing, Inc. 859 N.W. 2d 845 (Minn. 2015). 
 
New York Of the Great Lakes states, New York most closely follows the English common law 
tidal test. Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways 
and Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 907, 936 
(2007). Although Lake Erie and Lake Ontario are not tidal bodies of water, title is 
vested in the State for the public trust. Saunders v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River 
R.R., 38 N.E. 992, 994 (N.Y. 1894). Whether public and private boundaries are 
coterminous or overlapping is not clear, although the state appears to own exclu-
sively to the ordinary high water mark. See People ex rel. Burnhamv. Jones, 112 
N.Y. 597, 606 (1889): 
No question arises in this case over the line of riparian proprietorship along 
the lake, as it is conceded by both parties that it extends only to high-water 
mark on inland seas, or large navigable bodies of water like those of Lake On-
tario, and that the title to all lands beyond high-water mark, or under water, 
is in the state. 
(citations omitted). A trial court ruled in 1934 that a littoral shoreland owner on 
Lake Ontario took title to the low-water mark, Ransom v. Shaeffer, 274 N.Y.S. 570, 
573 (1934), citing to a 1923 court of appeals decision that had noted in dicta that 
littoral shoreland owners on inland lakes (not specifically a Great Lake) took title to 
the low-water mark, Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117 (1923). See also Chism v. 
Smith, 123 N.Y.S. 691 (App. Div. 1910) (noting in dicta that littoral landowners 
along large lakes own to the mean low water mark); Robin Kundis Craig, A Com-
parative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines, 16 Pa. St. Envtl L. Rev. 1, 87 
(2007) (finding that the line between public and private ownership in New York is 
the ordinary high water mark but acknowledging that “New York case law has not 
been crystal clear regarding this point”). See also N.Y. Pub. Lands Law § 75 
(McKinney 2018); Charles G. Stevenson, Title of Land Under Water in New York, 23 
Yale L.J. 397, 404 (1914) (arguing that lands submerged beneath navigable waters 
should be held in fee by the U.S. Government, not the states, and providing an 
historical survey of state legislation showing the State of New York claimed fee 
title to lands under navigable lakes as early as 1830). 
Regardless of the “public trust” limitation of its title, the State may convey away 
those lands to private persons or entities for “public, or such other purposes as it 
may determine to be for the best interests of the state.” People v. Steeplechase Park 
Co., 113 N.E. 521, 526-27 (N.Y. 1916); Saunders v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River 
R.R., 38 N.E. 992, 994 (N.Y. 1894). 
Key Statutes 
• N.Y. Pub. Lands Law § 75 (McKinney 2018) 
Key Cases 
• People ex rel. Burnham v. Jones, 112 N.Y. 597 (1889). 
• Saunders v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 38 N.E. 992 (N.Y.  
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1894). 
• Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 94 N.E. 199 (N.Y. 1911). 
• People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 1916). 
• Douglaston Manor v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 1997). 
 
Ohio Ohio statute declares ownership of the: 
waters of Lake Erie consisting of the territory within the boundaries of the 
state . . . together with the soil beneath and their contents . . . in trust for the 
people of the state, for the public uses to which they may be adapted, subject 
to the powers of the United States government, to the public rights of naviga-
tion, water commerce, and fishery, and to the property rights of littoral own-
ers, including the right to make reasonable use of the waters in front of or 
flowing past their lands. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1506.10 (LexisNexis 2001). The State’s department of nat-
ural resources is charged with enforcing State rights declared under the Fleming 
Act. Id. Also under this legislative authority, the State may permit private devel-
opment, use, and/or lease of Lake Erie if doing so does not impair public rights. Id. 
Littoral owners on Lake Erie have title to the natural shoreline. State ex rel. Squire 
v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 725 (Ohio 1948). Case law defines the “natu-
ral shoreline” as the line where water usually stands undisturbed. Sloan v. Biemil-
ler, 34 Ohio St. 492, 512 (1878). As recently as 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court de-
clined to adopt the ordinary high water mark and low water mark standards of 
other states. State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, 130 Ohio St. 
3d 30 (2011). 
Ohio goes further than other Great Lakes states in defining the State’s duties to 
protect the quality of public waters and related wildlife. State v. City of Bowling 
Green, 313 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio 1974). For example, in State v. City of Bowling Green, 
the City was held liable for negligent discharge of pollutants resulting in the death 
of wildlife. Id. The Court held that “an essential part of trust doctrine” is the 
State’s affirmative duty to act against negligence impacting property held in public 
trust. Id. at 411. However, plaintiffs seeking to enjoin projects alleging private nui-
sance must present “clear and convincing evidence of immediate and irreparable 
harm that would result from project.” Hack v. Sand Beach Conservancy Dist., 176 
Ohio App. 3d 309 (2008). 
Key Statutes 
• Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1506.10 (LexisNexis 2001). 
• Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1506.11 (LexisNexis 2001). 
Key Cases 
• Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492 (1878). 
• State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1948). 
• State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio 1974). 
• Thomas v. Sanders, 65 Ohio App. 2d 5 (1979). 
• Mitchell v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 507 N.E.2d 352 (Ohio 
1987). 
• Frances S. Buchholzer, 1993 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. 2-128 (1993). 
• Lemley v. Stevenson, 104 Ohio App.3d 126 (1995). 
• Hack v. Sand Beach Conservancy Dist., 176 Ohio App. 3d 309 (2008). 
• State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res., 130 Ohio St. 3d 30 
(2011). 
 
Pennsylvania Pennsylvanian law regarding application of the public trust doctrine to the Great 
Lakes is limited. It is accepted that the Commonwealth holds title to the beds of 
the Great Lakes within its territories in trust for the public. Dunlap v. Common-
wealth, 108 Pa. 607 (1885); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). More 
generally, if a lake is considered navigable, riparian owners take title to the low- 
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water mark subject to the public’s right of navigation, fishing, and other proper uses 
up to the high-water mark. Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210, 221 (1869). A Pennsylvania 
court has held that the Commonwealth does not lose title to filled land. Del. Ave., 




• Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210, 221 (1869). 
• Dunlap v. Commonwealth, 108 Pa. 607 (1885). 
• Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
• Del. Ave., LLC v. Dep’t of Conservation, 997 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 2010). 
 
Wisconsin The State of Wisconsin has an expansively defined duty to preserve public trust 
lands and waters, not limited to its duty to ensure navigability, protect natural re-
sources and the environment, and preserve scenic beauty. Just v. Marinette Cty., 
201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492 (1952). 
Case law has further held the State’s public trust duties to include eradication and 
prevention of pollution. Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat.l Res., 271 
N.W.2d 69 (Wis. 1978). 
Title in the Great Lakes is vested to the State up to the high-water mark, defined 
as “the point on the bank or shore up to which the presence and action of the water 
is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terres-
trial vegetation, or other easily recognized characteristic.” Diana Shooting Club v. 
Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 818-20 (Wis. 1914); but see Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225 
(1923) (suggesting that ownership interests are overlapping). Nonetheless, riparian 
owners are permitted to alter the shoreline of a navigable body of water upon re-
view and express permission by the State. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 
Wis. 492 (1952); Movrich v. Lobermeier, 372 Wis. 2d 724 (2016). 
Key Statutes 
• Wis. Stat. Ann. § 59.692 (West 2016) 
• Wis. Stat. Ann. § 281.11 (West 2018) 
• Wis. Stat. Ann. § 30.18 (West 2012) 
Key Cases 
• DeGayner & Co. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 236 N.W.2d 217 (Wis. 1875). 
• Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816 (Wis. 1914). 
• Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492 (1952). 
• State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957). 
• Just v. Marinette Cty., 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). 
• Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734 (Wis. 1974). 
• De Simone v. Kramer, 77 Wis. 2d 188 (1977). 
• Wis.’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 271 N.W.2d 69 (Wis. 
1978). 
• State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 1987). 
• Vill. of Menomonee Falls v. Wis. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 412 N.W.2d 505 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987). 
• Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t. of Nat. Res., 350 Wis. 2d 
45 (2013). 
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